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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the background to the enactment of the Credit 
Contracts Act 1981 and critically reviews the operation of that Act 
in the years to 1993 with a view to identifying and analysing three 
selected legal problem areas which have emerged. Where such 
legal problem areas are identified, reform proposals are formulated 
which are designed to clarify an area of uncertainty in the most 
appropriate way and in some cases, to recommend a rethink of 
policies which may no longer be appropriate to achieve the stated 
objectives of the Act. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 19,000 
words. 
High interest rates reward with income a very considerable and very 
influential part of the community of contentment. In the accepted 
economic attitudes, however, central-bank policy is socially neutral. 
In fact it strongly favours the rentier class, a group that is both 
affluent and vocal. It is an indubitably inescapable fact that those 
who have money to lend are likely to have more money than those 
who do not have money to lend - an economic truth that stands on a 
par with the unimpeachable observation attributed to Calvin 
Coolidge that when many people are out of work, unemployment 
results. 
John Kenneth Galbraith 
The Culture of Contentment 
1992 
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CREDIT CONTRACTS 1981 
DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Research Paper provides a brief background to the enactment 
of the Credit Contracts Act 1981, with commentary, sets out the 
main features of the Act, again, with commentary, identifies three 
selected areas where problems with the Act have occurred, and 
formulates recommendations for amendment to the Act in those 
selected areas. 
2. BACKGROUND TO THE ACT 
In March 1968 the then Minister of Justice instructed the Contracts 
and Commercial Law Reform Committee to study the law relating 
to money lending transactions and other agreements involving the 
extension of credit and to recommend reform in this area of law. 
Just short of 9 years later, in February 1977, the Law Reform 
Committee's report on credit contracts was presented to the Minister 
of Justice. 1 Including appendices, the report runs to 212 pages. It is 
not an easy read. Neither is its progeny, the Credit Contracts Act 
1981. 
The major impetus for the reference by the Minister of Justice to the 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee in 1968 was a 
widespread recognition that the Money Lenders Act 1908 was no 
longer adequate to control and regulate the extension of credit and 
the regulation of credit transactions in a society which had moved 
on considerably in its commercial practices in the 60 years since the 
Money Lenders Act was passed. 
Contracts & Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on Credit Contracts, Govt. 
Print, Wellington, 1977 
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The Money Lenders Act was of a very narrow application. It only 
applied if the financier was a money lender and if the credit was 
extended as a loan. The Act didn't apply to loans made by anybody 
other than a money lender and it also didn't apply where the 
transaction was not structured as a loan. To be a money lender a 
person had to be in the business of money lending. Excluded from 
the definition of money lender was any person who bona fide 
carried on business in the course of which money was lent by that 
person at no more than 10% interest. All money lenders had to be 
registered under the Act. There were restrictions on how a money 
lender could advertise his or her business, the form of a money 
lending contract was prescribed, there was a requirement that a 
memorandum setting out the credit terms of the transaction should 
be signed by the borrower before the money was lent, and the Court 
was empowered to reopen any money lending transaction which it 
considered to be harsh and unconscionable. In reopening a money 
lending transaction the Court could determine a suitable rate of 
interest to apply to that contract in the future and also to take an 
account between the parties to determine, inter alia, any amounts 
that should be refunded to a borrower or credited towards future 
loan repayments. 
So, technically there were three legal prerequisites before the Act 
applied: money had to be advanced by way of loan by a person who 
was in the business of money lending. Attempts to avoid one or 
more of these three preconditions lead to artificiality in the 
arrangement of certain types of credit transaction. Most commonly, 
a sale transaction was substituted for a loan. Another common 
device was to structure loan transactions as absolute assignments of 
book debts or the discounting of bills of exchange. 
As a result of attempts to avoid the application of the Act by 
structuring transactions so that they would not be legally classified 
as loans, a great deal of uncertainty crept into the law. This was 
particularly the case since the law relating to sham transactions was 
still, at that stage, in a state of flux. Some decisions2 pointed to an 
approach which looked no further than the intention of the parties as 
Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [ 1967] 2 QB 786 
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expressed in the documents, while other case law3 showed a 
willingness to go beyond the formalities of the documentation to 
look at the functional reality of the transaction, and classify a 
transaction in terms of its function and effect rather than its legally 
expressed form. 
A further defect in the Act was its extremely narrow application. 
When the Money Lenders Act was in force there were only two 
ways to reopen a harsh and unconscionable money lending 
transaction. The first was the situation where there was a loan made 
by a money lender. In this case section 3 of the Money Lenders Act 
applied. If the transaction in question related to a hire purchase 
agreement then relief was available under section 37 of the Hire 
Purchase Act 1971. However any transactions which fell outside of 
these two legislative provisions were not subject to any legislative 
doctrine of unconscionability, so that a contract could be reopened. 
For example, if there was a discounting transaction or a credit sale 
which was unconscionable there was no protection available for the 
instalment buyer or the borrower. 
Not only was the Money Lenders Act open to criticism on the basis 
that it had an extremely narrow focus, and that it could be avoided 
by careful structuring of transactions so that they were other than 
loan transactions, but the penalties for contravention of the Act were 
also extremely harsh. For example, if a person carried out a money 
lending business without registering as a money lender or carried on 
the business from a new address without first registering the change 
in the address of his or her business premises, then a loan made 
from the new office would have been illegal and completely 
unenforceable. (Remember, the Illegal Contracts 1970 did not come 
into force until 1 December 1970). In its 1977 Report,4 the 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee considered it 
unreasonable to allow a borrower to make an undeserved windfall 
Cash Order Purchases Ltd v Brady [1952] NZLR 898, Premor Ltd v Shaw Bros [1964] 
IWLR 978. But see also Bateman Television Ltd v Coleridge Finance Co. Ltd [1969] 
NZLR 794, at 813 when Turner J, in the New Zealand Court of Appeal, expressed a 
rigorous view of a sham whereby a transaction could only, properly, be viewed as a 
sham where "really doing one thing, the parties have resorted to a form which does not 
fit the facts, to deceive some third person ..... that they were doing something else. " 
Supra n.1. pp 36-38, paras 3.14 and 3.15 
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profit, solely because a lender had committed a technical breach of 
the Act which could not be shown to have harmed the borrower in 
any way. 
In summary, the disadvantages of the Act were that financiers were 
tempted to avoid the operation of the Act by dressing up loan 
transactions as something else, a practice which resulted in 
artificiality and uncertainty; transactions originally intended as non 
loan transactions were open to question because sometimes they 
were challenged on the ground that in reality they were loan 
transactions; the reopening provisions of the Act applied only to 
loans by money lenders and to loans at an interest rate exceeding 
10% by non money lenders, and the effect on the lender of 
contraventions, even of a purely technical nature, were excessively 
harsh, with no provision to ameliorate these penalties in certain 
circumstances. 
After extensive research and consultations and references to 
consumer credit reports prepared by experts in overseas jurisdictions 
(particularly in Australia and the UK)5 the Contracts and 
Commercial Law Reform Committee decided that the best approach 
for law reform in the area of credit transactions was to provide for a 
broadly based reform which would cover not only transactions 
which would previously have been classified as money lending 
transactions, but in fact practically all agreements which involved 
the extension of credit. The result of the Law Reform Committee's 
deliberations and report is legislation which has completely 
overhauled all aspects of credit financing in all of its forms. The 
new legislation swept away much of the established law and 
replaced it with an entirely new code. 
Unsurprisingly, as the time grew ever nearer to the 1 June 1982 
commencement date of the Credit Contract Act, the legal and 
accounting professions began to whip themselves into a foaming 
hysteria about the dire consequences that would ensue if the Act 
were allowed to come into force. By anyone's standards, the legal 
profession and others had ample time to make submissions both to 
Supra n. l. See collected references in Appendix II to the Report, pp. 197-199 
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the Law Reform Committee and to the Select Committee of 
Parliament. Despite this, the imminent collapse of the commercial 
credit industry and the impossibility, or at least the impracticability, 
of performing normal loan transactions was predicted by an ever 
growing chorus of dissent. 
The tone of the times is caught beautifully in the following extract 
from an article6 entitled, "The Credit Contracts Act - New Zealand's 
Frankenstein Monster": 
"On 1 June 1982 there will be delivered to the New Zealand 
public (largely now blissfully unsuspecting) a monster the 
like of which has not been seen anywhere else in the world -
the Credit Contracts Act 1981. The astonishing thing is that 
this creature has not been nurtured in some murky back street 
or distant hamlet by a mad scientist, but has been lovingly 
sculptured and created quite legally and openly. Regrettably 
the main architects come from the legal profession, and if 
ever there was law for the lawyers (made by lawyers) this is 
it. 
The Act is incredibly complicated and is going to require an 
extraordinary amount of changes to well established 
commercial practices which have existed for a long period. 
It is going to be administratively expensive and, of course, 
the ultimate payer will the public. It is going to take years of 
litigation before any great degree of certainty evolves on 
many aspects of it. It is going to involve more people in 
stress in a word which is stressful enough. And the tragedy 
of it all is that it is really unnecessary . 
. . . . .. . . . We all know we have got economic problems in this 
country but this Act certainly cannot help them. I am no 
economist but I can understand the simple fact that credit is a 
very necessary oil for the wheels of modern commerce and 
business. This Act seems to be doing its best to mix sand, or 
at least water, with the oil and neither do much to assist the 
W L Allan, (1982) NZLJ at 149 
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smooth running of machinery. One commentator at the Law 
Society seminar actually said (jocularly no doubt) that this 
legislation was "a benefaction" for the legal profession. 
There is no denying that, and clearly the legal profession and 
the printing industry will do well out of the Act. They will 
be the only ones who will ....... " 
As a result of this last minute avalanche of opposition, a number of 
urgent amendments were incorporated in the Credit Contracts 
Amendment Act 1982 which also came into force on 1 June 1982, 
the same date as the Credit Contracts Act 1981. 
The then Minister of Justice, the Honourable J K McLay, stated that 
the amendments were necessary to remove doubt from some areas 
of operation of the Act, but that he was confident that the overall 
structure and content of the Credit Contracts Act 1981 would 
provide a workable and effective solution to the problem of the 
regulation of credit transactions in New Zealand for the foreseeable 
future. 
1 June 1982 came and went to a background music of professional 
teeth gnashing, but despite considerable uncertainty in some areas 
of operation of the Act at its outset, the apocalyptic vision of 
lawyers and accountants wandering dazedly through a blasted credit 
landscape clutching overheated calculators and murmuring the 
words "finance rate", between muffled sobs, did not eventuate. 
3. MAIN FEATURES OF THE ACT 
The preamble to the Credit Contracts Act 1981 states that it is an 
Act to reform the law relating to the provision of credit under 
contracts of various kinds in order to -
(a) prevent oppressive contracts and conduct; 
(b) ensure that all the terms of contracts are disclosed to debtors 
before they become irrevocably committed to them; 
7 
( c) ensure that the costs of credit is disclosed on a uniform basis 
in order to prevent deception and encourage competition; 
and 
(d) prevent misleading credit advertisements; 
and to repeal the Money Lenders Act 1908. 
To achieve the legislative objectives, the Act provides for the 
reopening of oppressive credit contracts, the disclosure of 
information on a uniform basis to all those obtaining credit, the 
regulation of credit advertisements and for the prohibition of certain 
financiers and certain terms in credit contracts. 
Part I of the Act deals with reopening of oppressive credit contracts, 
and Part II deals with disclosure requirements. These two parts 
form the core structure of the Act. The other parts of the Act deal 
with advertising (Part III), prohibition of certain financiers and 
terms (Part IV), miscellaneous provisions (Part V) and 
consequential repeals, amendments and transitional provisions (Part 
VI). 
In an effort to maintain uniformity and consistency in the regulation 
of credit contracts, section 52A of the Hire Purchase Act 1971 
provides that the Credit Contracts Act is also to apply to hire 
purchase agreements, in addition to the provisions of the Hire 
Purchase Act 1971, and that neither Act is intended to limit the 
provisions of the other. As we shall see below, this shotgun 
marriage of inconvenience has spawned a host of problems in 
relation to disclosure of deferred payments dispositions (hire 
purchase contracts). 
Reopening of Oppressive Credit Contracts 
The core definition of credit contract is found in section 3(l)(a). 
This section defines a credit contract to be a contract under which a 
person provides or agrees to provide money or moneys worth in 
8 
consideration of a promise by another person to pay a sum or sums 
of money exceeding in aggregate the amount of the first mentioned 
money or moneys worth. Section 3(1)(b) extends this definition to 
include a contract under which a person forbears or agrees to 
forbear from requiring repayment of money owing in consideration 
of a promise by another to pay a sum or sums of money in the future 
which exceed in aggregate the original amount owing. 
Section 3( 4) shows that the legislation is intended to be concerned 
with function rather than form, as was the case under the Money 
Lenders Act 1908. Section 3(4) provides that -
"Where, by virtue of any contract or contracts (none of which 
by itself constitutes a credit contract) or any arrangement, 
there is a transaction that is in substance or effect a credit 
contract, the contract, contracts or arrangement shall for the 
purposes of this Act be deemed to be a credit contract made 
at the time when the contract, or the last of those contracts, or 
the arrangement, was made, as the case may be." (Emphasis 
added) 
It is almost ironic to find such a "substance over form" provision 
nestled in the bosom of such a technically drafted piece of 
legislation that it could be described as the high watermark of black 
letter law in the past decade. 
The next important definition is that of "oppression". Section 9 
defines oppressive to mean oppressive, harsh, unjustly burdensome, 
unconscionable or in contravention of reasonable standards of 
commercial practice. 
Section 10(1) provides that the Court may reopen any credit 
contract where the Court considers that: 
(a) the credit contract, or any term thereof is oppressive; 
or 
7 
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(b) a party under a credit contract is exercised, or intends 
to exercise, a right or power conferred by the contract 
. . 
man oppressive manner; or 
( c) a party under a credit contract has induced another 
party to enter into the contract by oppressive means. 
Recent case law7 has determined that the definition of oppression 
requires something more than unfairness. That there must be a 
sufficiently serious element of unfairness to merit reopening a 
contract Factors to be considered are the relative status of the 
parties, the nature and extent of the default, the way in which the 
default arose, the impact on the borrower, the attitude of the lender, 
the existence of a collateral purpose and the general appearance of 
the contract throughout. Clearly this is wider than the equitable 
doctrine of unconscionable bargains which appears to be restricted 
to a situation where one party to a transaction is at a a special 
disadvantage in dealing with the other party because of illness, 
ignorance, lunacy, inexperience, financial need or other 
circumstances such that that person's ability to protect their own 
interests is severely impaired and the other party takes unfair 
advantage of the situation. Such a widening of the concept of 
unconscionability is to be expected in remedial legislation such as 
this. 
If the Court considers that there is a credit contract and that any 
term or the exercise of any power or any act thereunder is 
oppressive, or that a party has been induced by the other party to 
enter into the credit contract by oppressive means (section 10), then 
as long as proceedings to reopen the credit contract are instituted not 
more than 6 months after the date on which the last obligation to be 
performed under the contract is performed then the Court may re-
open the contract (section 12). Upon reopening, the Court has a 
wide discretion to provide a just resolution of the dispute (section 
14). 
See Shetter v Westpac Banking Corporation [1988] 2 NZLR 316,342; Didsbury v 
Zion Farms Ltd (1 989) 1 NZ ConvC 190,229 at 190,238 . 
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The limitation of six months contained in section 12 is clearly 
intended to maintain a degree of commercial certainty, while also 
providing a reasonable period within which people who feel that 
they have been aggrieved may take action. 
Disclosure Requirements 
The disclosure regime only applies to "controlled credit contracts", a 
sub-species of credit contract. "Controlled credit contract" is 
defined in section 15 of the Act as a credit contract: 
(a) Where the creditor, or one of the creditors, for the 
time being is a financier acting in the course of his 
business; or 
(b) Which results from an introduction of one of the 
parties to the contract to another such party by a paid 
adviser; or 
(c) That has been prepared by a paid adviser. 
The distinction between a credit contract simpliciter and a 
controlled credit contract is critical. While it is necessary to define 
the basic credit contract expansively in order to bring a wide range 
of contracts within the unconscionability provisions, and thus 
subject them to the reopening regime, common sense, policy, and 
commercial practicality dictated that a further subcategory of 
contract denoted by the term "controlled credit contract" be created 
and subjected to the further rigours of the disclosure regime. 
It can be seen from section 15 that the essence of the distinction 
between the two terms is that a controlled credit contract is one 
where a professional financier or a paid adviser has been involved in 
the credit transaction. The rationale behind this is that the Act is 
designed, in part, to redress the apparent inequality of bargaining 
power, commercial sophistication and knowledge between people 
whose business is the provision of finance, and ordinary members of 
the public. It would be inappropriate to impo e the disclosure 
11 
regime in a situation where the balance of power and knowledge 
was relatively equal between the parties. Also, only professional 
lenders are capable of complying with the Credit Contracts Act 
disclosure regime, and the comparative credit shopping objective of 
the Act "implicates" primarily professional lenders. This 
demonstrates that the focus of the Act is fairly and squarely upon 
redressing inequalities of bargaining power in the credit 
marketplace. 
Given this primary focus, it is perhaps surprising that the Act has 
not been limited to "consumer" transactions. New Zealand is 
unique in the world in subjecting commercial transactions (i.e. 
transactions between "business people") to a "truth in lending" 
regime. 
Consistently with this philosophy, section 15 contains a number of 
categories of credit contract which are excluded from the more 
onerous definition of controlled credit contract. 
Section 15(1) paragraphs (d) - (m) specify those credit contracts 
which are not to be controlled credit contracts, regardless of whether 
a creditor is a financier, or a paid adviser has introduced the parties 
or prepared the contract. These paragraphs provide as follows: 
"(d) A contract where every debtor for the time being is -
(i) A financier by virtue of either paragraph (a) or 
paragraph ( c) of the definition of that term; or 
(ii) The Crown, a local authority, or a Government 
agency; or 
(iii) A body corporate that has a paid up capital of 
not less than $1 ,000,000; or a body corporate 
that is related to such a body; or 
12 
( e) A contract where every party to the contract for the 
time being is a body corporate that is related to every 
other such party to the contract; or 
(f) A contract if the total amount of credit outstanding 
under that contract and under all other contracts 
between the same creditor and debtor is or will be not 
less than $250,000; or 
(g) A contract that results from an offer of securities to 
the public within the meaning of sections 2 and 3 of 
the Securities Act 1978; or 
(h) A contract the only effect of which is to modify the 
terms of a controlled credit contract; or 
(i) A contract entered into pursuant to a revolving credit 
contract; or 
U) A contract entered into pursuant to a registered 
superannuation scheme; or 
(k) A contract that forms part of a transaction involving 
the export from New Zealand, or the import into New 
Zealand, of goods or services and that is entered into 
for the purpose of facilitating the export or import of 
those goods or services; or 
(1) An agreement to which sections 5 and 7 of the Door to 
Door Sale Act 1967 apply; or 
(m) A contract of a kind specified in regulations made 
under section 47(1)(d) of this Act. 
The categories of credit contract exempted from the definition 
"controlled credit contract" exemplify situations either where the 
parties can be presumed to be able to take care of themselves (paras 
d, e and f), where policy or commercial workability dictate that the 
13 
applicability of the disclosure regime would be inappropriate (para 
k), or where alternative disclosure regimes apply (paras. g, j and 1). 
The essence of the disclosure requirements then, is the desire by the 
legislature to provide for the "person in the street" to be able to shop 
around in an informed matter for the best credit terms possible. To 
this end, two key terms relating to disclosure are "total cost of 
credit", and "finance rate". 
Total cost of credit is defined by section 5(1) in relation to a credit 
contract to mean the total of all money and moneys worth that the 
debtor has paid or provided or is or may become liable to pay or 
provide either by virtue of the contract, or to or for the benefit of the 
creditor in respect of the contract, less certain amounts, such as, 
obviously, the amount of credit provided, and also, importantly, the 
amounts specified in section 3(3)(b) of the Act. 
These excluded amounts relate to incidental services (section 
3(3)(b)(i)) and other matters where it can reasonably be said either 
that extra value is added to the contract above and beyond what 
would normally be regarded as purely a credit charge for 
compensation for being kept out of one's money over time (and 
which could also apply in a cash sale transaction), or when the 
amount cannot reasonably be classified as a charge for credit, e.g. 
any reasonable amount payable as a result of a default under the 
contract by the promisor (section 3(3)(b )(ii). 
The term "finance rate" is defined in section 6 as being the rate that 
expresses the total cost of credit as a percentage per annum of the 
amount of credit, and is either the annual finance rate, as defined in 
the First Schedule to the Act, or a rate correctly derived from tables 
prepared by the Government Actuary to produce the annual finance 
rate for the type of credit contract being considered. Both are 
calculated using the actuarial method. 
What this serpentine maze of definitions is intended to achieve is to 
provide the true cost of credit to the debtor in a uniform fashion. If 
this is expressed as a finance rate and all other providers of credit 
14 
are required by the Act to provide the potential debtor with a 
uniformly calculated finance rate, then it is a simple operation for 
the debtor to compare the numbers and pick the lowest finance rate 
to get the best deal. However, the finance rate is not the only factor 
considered in comparative shopping. Some consumers would look 
at cash flow aspects and prefer a higher finance rate contract with a 
longer pay out period to a lower finance rate contract with a shorter 
payout period. Further, many people will already have made a 
decision before disclosure is made! 
While clearly this credit-shopping rationale is fine in theory, in 
practice it is highly unlikely that Mr or Mrs X shopping for a waste 
disposal unit on a Friday night who finds a unit basically to their 
liking, is going to spend the week trudging around town to find the 
best finance rate available. Given the inherent unlikelihood that the 
people whom the Act is intended to benefit most will have the 
knowledge or inclination to take advantage of the Act, perhaps a 
major rationale for the disclosure regime disappears, particularly in 
view of the fact that, typically, initial disclosure of, for example, a 
hire purchase contract for a waste disposal unit, including the 
finance rate, will not take place until some days after the purchase 
has been concluded! 
Four types of disclosure are provided for by Part II of the Act: 
(1) initial disclosure; 
(2) modification disclosure; 
(3) continuing disclosure (of revolving credit contracts); 
( 4) request disclosure. 
The objectives of disclosure can be stated to be: 
(a) to enable comparison of various credit source 
available; 
15 
(b) to enable a borrower to make a choice between buying 
on credit or paying cash; 
( c) to ensure that potential debtors are aware of their 
rights and obligations under the credit contract; 
(d) to ensure that at any time during the term of a credit 
contract a debtor is able to ascertain the exact terms of 
that credit contract and his or her obligations 
thereunder. 
In relation to the time before a Credit Contract Act becomes 
binding, the Act provides a three day "cooling off" period after 
initial or modification disclosure has been made when the debtor 
can theoretically sit back and decide if they want to continue with 
that contract (section 22). 
Given that the purpose of initial disclosure is to facilitate 
comparison shopping for credit, the rational use of credit compared 
with buying for cash, and to ensure prior familiarity with the terms 
of credit transactions, it does not seem particularly rational to 
attempt to achieve this by giving a three day cooling off period. 
One may well ask why a person shopping for credit could not "do 
the rounds" before deciding to enter into a binding contract. 
Presumably, the legislature envisaged that in the cold light of 
morning a potential debtor would be focused and sufficiently 
motivated to engage in this largely mythical credit shopping 
exercise by exercising his or her rights under section 22 to cancel a 
controlled credit contract which does not appear to be as affordable 
or favourable after full disclosure has been made. 
It should also be noted that, by virtue of section 22(2), the same 
level of "cooling off" protection is not extended to purchasers under 
a deferred payment disposition, because in order to take advantage 
of this provision and cancel the credit provisions of the contract, the 
purchaser must be able to pay the cash price for the relevant 
property or services, up front! For major and expensive whiteware, 
or other similar consumer items, the prospective purchasers will 
16 
usually not have the cash immediately to, in effect, buy themselves 
out of the contract. 
In relation to post-contract formation disclosure, there are three 
categories of disclosure. The first category of post contract 
disclosure is modification disclosure where there is provision for the 
terms of controlled credit contracts which are modified or varied to 
also be disclosed (section 17). Secondly, in relation to revolving 
credit contracts (such as credit cards), there is continuing disclosure 
where, within a certain time after the end of each billing period 
certain key terms of the revolving credit contract are disclosed to 
keep the debtor aware of his or her credit position. The final 
category is request disclosure, where a debtor or guarantor under a 
controlled credit contract may request in writing that the creditor 
disclose essential particulars described in the Act. 
Penalties for Non Compliance 
Failure to comply with the disclosure provisions can result in a loss 
to the creditor of part or all of the total cost of credit which remains 
payable under the contract (sections 25 to 28). 
Typically these sections provide for the liability of every debtor and 
guarantor under the controlled credit contract to be extinguished for 
"a specified amount" if the relevant form of disclosure has not been 
made. The "specified amount" is the smaller of: 
(a) An amount equal to three times the part of the total cost of 
credit that relates to the period from the day the contract [or 
modification contract] is made until the earlier of the 
following days: 
(i) The day on which [initial or modification] disclosure 
is made: 
(ii) The day that is 8 months after the day the contract [or 
modification contract] is made: 
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(b) The total cost of credit payable under the contract [in the case 
of failure to make initial disclosure] 
or 
(c) The total cost of credit payable under the modified credit 
contract in respect of the period from the day the 
modification contract is made until the day on which the 
modified credit contract expires [in the case of failure to 
make modification disclosure] 
or 
(d) The day the contract expires [in the case of failure to make 
request disclosure]. 
In respect of request disclosure the beginning of the period from 
which potential extinguishment of credit charges liability applies is 
the time that the specified fee is received by the creditor. If failure 
is made to make request disclosure in respect of a revolving credit 
contract the cost of credit which is liable to extinguishment is three 
times the total cost of credit payable under the contract in respect of 
the last completed billing period before the request is made. 
As can be seen by the above provisions, the potential forfeiture of 
three times the total cost of credit for a given period, until proper 
disclosure is made, is a punitive device to ensure that proper 
disclosure is made by the creditor without further delay. This "triple 
damages" incentive approach is, however, subject to the palliative 
provisions in sections 31 and 3 2. 
It is notable that if there is a failure to make continuing disclosure in 
respect of a revolving credit contract for any billing period then the 
debtor's liability to pay the total cost of credit in respect of that 
billing period is extinguished (section 27(a)). It is not immediately 
apparent why the extinguishment is not for three times the total cost 
of credit for that billing period, as is the approach in relation to 
initial, modification and request disclosure. 
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This is particularly puzzling since section 28(2)(a) provides that in 
relation to a failure to make request disclosure of a revolving credit 
contract the creditor is liable to forfeit three times the total cost of 
credit payable in respect of the last completed billing period before 
the request is made. 
For the sake of consistency it is submitted that section 27(a) should 
be amended to also provide for the extinguishment of three times 
the total cost of credit for the relevant billing period. 
Relief from Penalties for Non-Compliance 
There are a number of grounds upon which a creditor may be 
entitled to relief for non disclosure (section 31). Section 32 also 
provides a general ameliorating provision whereby the Court may, 
on the application of the creditor, make various orders to reduce the 
penalty that the creditor would otherwise suffer. 
Sections 31 and 32 provide: 
Section 31 Relief For Inadvertent Non-Disclosure 
31 Sections 24 to 28 of this Act shall not apply in respect 
of a failure to make initial disclosure, modification 
disclosure, continuing disclosure, or request disclosure 
of a controlled credit contract or modification contract 
(as the case may be) if the creditor shows that -
(a) The failure was due to inadvertence or to 
events outside the control of the creditor; and 
(b) Disclosure was made as soon as reasonably 
practicable after the failure was discovered by 
the creditor or brought to his notice; and 
( c) Where disclosure documents relating to the 
contract state as the finance rate of the contract 
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a rate that is less than the correct finance rate, 
the creditor has reduced the finance rate of the 
contract to the rate disclosed in those 
documents; and 
( d) The creditor compensated or offered to 
compensate the debtor under the contract for 
any prejudice caused the debtor by the failure. 
Section 32 Power of Court to Reduce Penalty 
32(1) [Order] The Court may, on the application of a 
creditor under a credit contract, order -
(a) That any of sections 24 to 28 of this Act shall 
not apply in respect of a credit contract, or 
modification contract, or any class or classes of 
such contracts; or 
(b) That an amount for which liability has been 
extinguished pursuant to any of those sections 
be reduced to an amount specified by the 
Court. 
32(2) [Criteria] In deciding whether to make such an order, 
the Court shall have regard to the following matters: 
(a) Whether the creditor is a financier; 
(b) The extent of, and the reasons for, the non-
disclosure; 
(c) The extent to which a debtor or guarantor has 
been prejudiced by the non-disclosure; 
( d) Such other matters as the Court thinks fit. 
4. 
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32(3) [Conditions] Any order under this section may be 
made on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks fit. 
It is clear, particularly from section 32, that the framers of the Act 
wished to preserve as much flexibility as possible to do justice 
between the parties, while putting the onus firmly on the creditor to 
make out a good case for relief from the penalty provisions 
contained in sections 25 to 28. These provisions are clearly a major 
improvement over the draconian, absolute and inflexible penalty 
provisions contained in the Money Lenders Act 1908. 
SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEM AREAS 
The problem areas that I have selected for discussion are: 
(a) the correct interpretation of section 15(l)(f); 
(b) the necessity for disclosure to guarantors; and 
(c) the correct interpretation of section 3(3)(b)(ii). 
Each of these areas will now be discussed in turn and reform 
proposals formulated to cure the perceived deficiencies in each area. 
(a) Section 15{1)(f): 
What is the current law? 
The first issue is the correct interpretation of section 15(l)(f). 
The section provides that the term "controlled credit 
contract" does not include: 
A contract if the total amount of credit outstanding 
under that contract and under all other contracts 
between the same creditor and debtor is or will be not 
less than $250,000 
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The correct interpretation of the section is of great 
importance because if the exclusion can be relied upon then 
the contract i not subject to the disclosure requirements 
contained in Part II of the Act. It should be noted, that if the 
contract is a credit contract (but not a controlled credit 
contract) then it is still subject to the re-opening provisions 
contained in Part 1 of the Act. 
The Act 
The section is ambiguous. The following interpretations are 
possible: 
1. The exclusion applies and continues to apply to the 
contract if $250,000 is advanced at the time the 
contract is entered into, or subsequently (pursuant to a 
mutually binding obligation contained in the contract), 
notwithstanding that the total amount of credit 
outstanding may subsequently be reduced to below the 
$250,000 level by repayments, some form of set-off 
available to the debtor, or debt forgiveness. 
2. If at any time during the term of the contract the total 
amount of credit outstanding falls at any time below 
$250,000 then the contract immediately becomes a 
controlled credit contract which is subject to the 
disclosure provisions. 
3. If there are a number of existing controlled credit 
contracts between the parties and the total amount of 
credit outstanding is less than $250,000, but a further 
credit contract is entered into which increases the total 
amount of credit outstanding under all contracts to 
more than $250,000 then only the final contract which 
tips the scales over $250,000 is not a controlled credit 
contract. 
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A key term in the section is "total amount of credit". While 
this is not defined (unlike "total cost of credit, which is 
defined in section 5), "credit" is defined in section 2(1) to 
mean: 
(a) In relation to a credit contract of the kind specified in 
section 3(l)(a) of this Act.. .... , the money or money's 
worth provided or agreed to be provided; 
(b) In relation to a credit contract of the kind specified in 
section 3(l)(b) of this Act, the money, payment of 
which is forborne or agreed to be forborne; 
(c) In relation to a credit contract of the kind specified in 
paragraph ( d) or paragraph ( e) of section 3(1) of this 
Act, the cash price of the property, services, or goods, 
less the following amounts: 
(i) the amount of any deposit paid at or before the 
time of the making of the contract; 
(ii) the amount of any trade-in allowance agreed 
on; 
and "amount of credit" includes any amount which is 
provided to the debtor to meet any of the expenses 
coming within section 3(3)(b) of this Act or which is 
disbursed or deducted by the creditor to meet any of 
those expenses. 
For the purposes of this paper only para (a) is relevant. 
Section 3(1) defines "credit contract" to mean: 
(a) a contract under which a person provides or agrees to 
provide money or money's worth in consideration of a 
promise by another person to pay, or to procure the 
payment of, in the future and in respect of the 
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provision, a sum or sums of money, exceeding in 
aggregate the amount of the first-mentioned money or 
money's worth; or 
(b) a contract under which a person forbears or agrees to 
forbear from requiring payment of money owing to 
him in consideration of a promise by another person to 
pay, or to procure the payment of, in the future and in 
respect of the forbearance, a sum or sums of money 
exceeding in aggregate the amount of the first-
mentioned money; 
and without limiting the generality of paragraphs (a) and (b) 
of this subsection, includes: 
(c) a contract under which a person lends or agrees to 
lend money in consideration of a promise by another 
person to pay, or to procure the payment of, in the 
future and in respect of the loan, a sum or sums of 
money exceeding in aggregate the amount of loan ... 
Section 3( 1 )( c) is a sub-species of contract which is already 
covered by the general para (a). It is unclear why the drafter 
of the section considered it necessary to specifically include a 
reference to a loan contract (para (c)) when, it is submitted, 
there is no doubt that it is already covered by para (a). (Both 
paras (a) and (c) appear wide enough to cover contracts of 
loan and guarantee, the latter because both paragraphs are 
drafted in such a way that it is not necessary for the credit to 
be extended to the same person that provides the promise to 
pay, or to procure the payment of, a greater sum in the 
future). 
As we have already seen, the definition of "credit", in 
relation to a contract of the kind covered by para (a) means 
"the money or money's worth provided or agreed to be 
provided". 
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By applying this definition to section 15(1)(f) it can be 
argued that a credit contract would be excluded from the 
category of controlled credit contract if the total amount of 
the money provided for or agreed to be provided under that 
contract ( and under all other contracts between the same 
creditor and debtor) is, or will be, not less than $250,000. 
So, it could be argued that if $250,000 credit is immediately 
advanced pursuant to the contract, or that single or multiple 
drawdowns totalling not less than $250,000 will definitely be 
advanced in the future, then the contract is not a controlled 
credit contract, regardless of whether at some time during the 
life of the contract the total indebtedness falls below the 
$250,000 threshold. 
The presence of the word "outstanding" in section 15(l)(f) 
needs to be considered in relation to the definition of "credit" 
which we have now established applies to contracts of loan 
(under section 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(c)). It seems that when the 
applicability of the exemption contained in section 15(1)(f) is 
being considered in the context of a credit contract within the 
definition contained in section 3(l)(a) and (c) then the 
concept of "credit outstanding" becomes redundant because 
"credit" in relation to a loan contract is defined as "the money 
...... provided or agreed to be provided". To make sense of 
the provision, "outstanding" must be read as "advanced or 
agreed to be advanced". 
The opposing argument is that the word "outstanding" should 
be given its plain and ordinary meaning of "due and owing" 
and, when read with the words "is or will be", requires an 
outstanding credit balance of at least $250,000 to be 
maintained throughout the term of the contract if it is to 
remain excluded from the category "controlled credit 
contract". 
It is suggested that this argument is not persuasive. If this 
interpretation was correct then only credit contracts under 
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which interest only was repayable periodically throughout 
the term of the contract ( e.g. flat, as opposed to table 
mortgages) would not metamorphose into controlled credit 
contracts at some point during that term. In any type of 
credit contract, other than one under which interest only was 
payable during the term of the contract (until the final 
instalment, when all of the principal, as well as the final 
instalment of interest, is due) periodic principal repayments 
would, necessarily, reduce the outstanding balance of the 
"total amount of credit" to less than the $250,000 "trigger"! 
Another powerful supporting argument in favour of the 
interpretation that the total amount by credit outstanding only 
needs to be at least $250,000 when the contract is made ( or 
there is a mutual obligation that $250,000 be advanced at a 
later date or dates) and that future repayments which reduce 
the outstanding credit balance to less than $250,000 are 
irrelevant for the purposes of section 15(l)(f) is that section 
16 provides for initial disclosure to be made either: 
(a) before the contract is "made"; or 
(b) not later than 15 working days after the contract is 
made. 
The choice of time of disclosure provided by section 16 
could arguably explain the use of the words "is or will be not 
less than $250,000" in section 15(1)(f). 
The words "or will be" have not been included in section 
15(l)(f) to add a requirement that an outstanding credit 
balance can never be less than $250,000 (if it was at least 
$250,000 when the contract was entered into or when the 
initial disclosure is made in respect of a sum of credit of at 
least $250,000 before the contract is made. (Section 
16(1)(a)). Clearly, if disclosure is made before any 
contractual obligations arise then there is, at that point, no 
credit outstanding and consequently the words "or will be" 
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anticipate the making of a loan contract of at least $250,000. 
So, the words "or will be" in section 15(1)(f) have been 
included to recognise that disclosure will often be made 
before a binding contract is entered into such that it is only at 
some time after disclosure has been made that any credit will 
be outstanding. 
A further argument in favour of the interpretation set out 
above derives considerable additional support from section 
16. As stated above, initial disclosure is contemplated either 
before the contract is entered into or within 15 working days 
of the contract being entered into. If a credit contract could 
"become" a controlled credit contract during the term of a 
loan at any time when the credit outstanding fell below 
$250,000, if only for a short period, then, in theory, initial 
disclosure would be required. However, reading section 
15(1)(f) in this way makes a nonsense of section 16, which 
cannot, by its terms apply unless a very strained 
interpretation is adopted whereby a credit contract does not 
metamorphose into a controlled credit contract when the 
level of debt falls below $250,000. Rather, to make any 
sense of attempting to apply the initial disclosure regime 
contained in section 16, it would have to be held that an 
entirely new contract arises, which necessitates initial 
disclosure. It is submitted that such an artificial 
interpretation is difficult to sustain. 
From the foregoing, it is submitted that if a contract specifies 
that at least $250,000 is to be advanced in a single drawdown 
either immediately or at some later date (and such a sum is in 
fact drawn down) then the exemption in section 15(1)(f) may 
be relied upon. The fact that there may be less than $250,000 
of debt due at some time during the term of the contract is 
irrelevant. The crucial time in relation to the obligation to 
make the advance is the time when the contract is entered 
into, regardless of whether the full $250,000 is drawn down 
in one hit, or in progressive tranches. 
8 
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At the least, it can be said that the intent behind the section is 
uncertain. 
The "Literature" 
D F Dugdale,8 in his commentary on section 15, states: 
Paragraph (d). The philosophy of this provision is 
that some debtors can be expected to be able to look 
after themselves. There are excluded from the 
category of "controlled credit contracts" under which 
the debtor is himself a financier, the Crown, a local 
authority, a Government agency, a body corporate 
with a paid up capital of a million dollars or a related 
body corporate ...... ". 
Paragraph (f). Contracts where the amount advanced 
(taking into account other contracts between the same 
parties) is not less than $250,000 are excluded from 
the definition of controlled credit contract. There is 
no provision for varying this figure to take account of 
inflation, and if the value of New Zealand currency 
continues to depreciate it may well be found that this 
paragraph allows the most significant gap in the 
protection afforded by Part II. 
( emphasis added) 
It is clear that the philosophy that "some debtors can be 
expected to look after themselves", which Dugdale applies to 
the exclusion contained in para (d), is equally applicable to 
para (f). 
It is also noteworthy that Dugdale refers to "the amount 
advanced" (emphasis added) being not less than $250,000, 
not the amount outstanding. As a member of the Contracts 
and Commercial Law Reform Committee which produced 
the Report from which the Act eventually emerged (albeit in 
Dugdale D F, The Credit Contracts Act 1981, Butterworths, Wellington, 1981 
9 
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a form which did not follow all of that Committee's 
recommendations), it is indicative of the intention behind the 
provision that the author uses this term to paraphrase the 
thrust to paragraph (f). 
Professor D W McLauchlan has stated in relation to the Act 
in a 1984 article9 : 
What is the justification for imposing formal 
disclosure requirements where businessmen enter into 
large scale financing transactions involving say, 
$200,000? No other country in the word does so. 
They all employ one or more of a variety of 
techniques to limit disclosure to consumer transactions 
I would like to see the present exemption from the 
Act's disclosure requirements of transactions 
involving $250,000 or more lowered to a more 
realistic figure of $50,000 - and even that is high in 
comparison with overseas legislation. 
The Credit Contracts Act is supposed to be essentially 
a consumer protection measure. Its main aim is to 
redress the inequalities between credit providers and 
those who use credit for private purposes. 
Professor McLauchlan's comments appear to proceed from 
an assumption (shared by Dugdale) that transactions 
involving $250,000 or more are exempt from the disclosure 
requirements of Part II of the Act, whether or not the level of 
credit due falls below $250,000 at any time during the term 
of the loan, as it often will in relation to loan advances to 
small/medium businesses where regular, periodic repayments 
of principal and/or interest are made. 
McLauchlan D W, Contract & Commercial Law Reform in New Zealand, (1984) 11 
NZULR 36 at 62-63 
10 
II 
12 
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All of the overseas legislative examples cited by Professor 
McLachlan10 to illustrate devices which are used to limit the 
application of consumer credit legislation are framed on the 
basis that transactions where the amount involved/credit 
extended exceeds a certain figure are excluded. 
It is also significant that Dugdale 11 discusses whether a credit 
contract can change its character to become a controlled 
credit contract and vice versa: 
Can a credit contract during its life change its status 
from controlled credit contract to credit contract or 
vice versa? What for example is the position if the 
creditor under a credit contract (not a controlled credit 
contract) assigns his interest to a financier? The use 
of the words "for the time being" (rather than such 
words as "when the contract is made") in paragraphs 
(a), (d) and (e) and s.18(1) suggest that a credit 
contract can so change its status. 
What is significant about Dugdale's comment is what it does 
not say. He does not even consider the possibility that 
contracts outside of paras (a), (d) or (e) could be mutable. 
However, it has been suggested by D M Forsell 12, in relation 
to paragraph (f), that a contract can change its character: 
By virtue of s.15(l)(f) of the Act "a contract, if the 
total amount of credit outstanding under the contract 
and under all other contracts between the said creditor 
See footnotes supra n. 9 at p. 62 footnote 15. Most of the Acts cited have been 
subsequently amended by increasing the "cut-off' amount to recognise the effect of 
rampant inflation on the real value of money . However, none of the Acts have 
increased the threshhold sums in "real" terms, only inflation-adjusted them. 
Supra n. 8 
Forsell D M, A Few Comments on the Credit Contracts Act 1981 , (1982) NZLJ 219, 
at 219-220 
13 
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and debtor is or will be not less than $250,000" is not 
a controlled credit contract. 
If, pursuant to a credit contract between a debtor and a 
creditor, "the amount of credit outstanding" fluctuates 
so that at some times it is $250,000 or more and at 
other times less than $250,000, it seems that there is a 
corresponding fluctuation in the nature of the contract 
from controlled to uncontrolled and from uncontrolled 
to controlled. 
It is submitted that the better view is that of Dugdale, who 
proceeds from the assumption that the only relevant time to 
access exclusion from or inclusion in the category 
"controlled credit contract" is when the amount of credit is 
actually advanced. Subsequent repayments are therefore 
irrelevant because a "debtor who can be expected to look 
after himself' doesn't suddenly become less able to do so 
after repaying $100,000 of an initial $250,000 advance! 
The apparently deliberate use of that troubling word 
"outstanding" still leaves one unable to state with absolute 
certainty which is the correct interpretation of section 
15(1)(f). 
The Cases 
Two recent cases discuss this issue. 
In Jenkins 13 v NZI Finance Limited Tompkins, J stated: 
Disclosure 
The third cause of action pleads that the mortgage was 
a controlled credit contract, within s.15 of the Credit 
Contracts Act 1981, and that NZI did not make 
Unreported. M 320/87, Hamilton Registry, 23.8.88 
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available to Mr and Mrs Jenkins the disclosure 
documents required by s.21. 
Section 15(1) provides that the term "controlled credit 
contract" means a credit contract, inter alia where the 
creditor is a financier, acting in the course of its 
business. NZI is within that definition. But subs (1) 
also provides that the term does not include: 
"(f) a contract if the total amount of credit 
outstanding under that contract and under all 
other contracts between the same creditor and 
debtor is, or will be not less than $250,000." 
Mr Hassall submitted that the mortgage was not 
within that exception because there was nothing in the 
mortgage to show that the amount owing under any 
advance made pursuant to the March facility, would 
be not less than $250,000. In that respect he is 
correct. The March facility provides that the total 
amount of all advances made under it "shall not 
exceed $500,000" and that each advance under the 
facility "shall be not less than $50,000". Quite clearly 
then, it would be possible for the amount advanced 
under the facility to be less than $250,000. 
But that, in my view, does not take the mortgage out 
of the exception. It applies if the total amount of 
credit outstanding is, or will be, not less than 
$250,000. The evidence establishes that as a matter of 
fact the total amount of credit outstanding was more 
than $250,000. It is the actual amount of credit 
outstanding that is determinative, not what, under the 
terms of the contract, could have been the amount of 
credit outstanding. 
Mr Hassall submitted that as at 8 May 1986 [the date 
the mortgage was executed], there wa only 
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outstanding under the March facility, $89,247.81, 
being the amount that was paid to M B Jenkins 
Limited that day. He submitted that the earlier 
payment of $410,752.19, made on 4th February 1986, 
could not be an amount outstanding under the March 
facility because it was made before the March facility 
was executed. I do not accept this submission. It is 
apparent from Mr Heapy's evidence, that the payment 
was being made because Head Office had authorised 
the facility and in anticipation of it being accepted. 
Once the March facility was completed, then that 
amount, as well as the amount paid on 6th March 
1986, became the total amount of credit outstanding 
under that contract. (Emphasis added) 
It is clear from His Honour's comments that for section 
15(l)(f) to apply, the total credit outstanding under the 
facility would have to be at least $250,000. In this case there 
was a facility made available up to a limit of $500,000 and 
the Judge recognised that the mere availability of credit over 
$250,000 was not enough to bring the contract within the 
exemption. There was only the promise by the creditor to 
make up to $500,000 available if the debtor so requested, but 
no binding agreement to provide any credit at all unless a 
request was made. 
His Honour's comment that it would be possible for the 
amount advanced under the facility to be less than $250,000 
is related to the time the mortgage contract was executed, i.e. 
8 May 1986. It was his view that it is the actual amount of 
credit advanced at the time the credit contract is entered into 
( or the amount that will ultimately be advanced by virtue of a 
legally enforceable obligation) that is the determining factor. 
At the least therefore, it can be asserted with some 
confidence that the Judge's comments are not in direct 
conflict with the interpretation argued for in this paper. 
14 
15 
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The other case which bears on this issue is Buckland v 
Landbase Securities Limited (In Liquidation). 14 Anderson J 
states: 
It is argued on behalf of the defendant that here was a 
contract in respect of which a credit would be not less 
than $250,000, it being common ground that only 
approximately $200,000 capital was drawn down. I 
do not accept that argument. The evidence of the 
contract before me shows that the total amount of 
credit outstanding might have become in excess of 
$250,000 but there was no contractual obligation on 
the part of the plaintiff to drawn down more than the 
initial advance of $66,000, coupled with a right to call 
on the defendant to advance up to $270,000. The 
situation is that although the defendant could not have 
resisted calls to the extent of $270,000, the plaintiff 
could have resisted the enforcement of a loan leaving 
him indebted to the extent of $270,000. It is perfectly 
plain that the total amount of credit outstanding might 
have become more than $250.000 but was not bound 
in terms of the contract to attain that level. 
Accordingly, the Credit Contracts Act applies. 
(Emphasis added) 
Like Jenkins, 15 Buckland is not dispositive of the 
interpretation issue under consideration, but again, there are 
tantalising hints, particularly in the last (highlighted) 
sentence of Buckland that what is important is the amount 
initially advanced or in respect of which there is a 
contractually binding commitment on both the creditor and 
the debtor to lend and borrow a sum of at least $250,000. 
A final issue relates to the situation where there are a number 
of controlled credit contracts between the creditor and the 
debtor and the $250,000 cut-off must be assessed. Once the 
Unreported. CP 2604/89, Auckland Registry, 11.4.91 at p. 5 
Supran. 13 
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threshold is crossed are all of the constituent controlled credit 
contracts together to be regarded as no longer controlled 
credit contracts, or only the final contract that tips the 
combined contracts over the $250,000 threshold? 
A plain reading of section 15(l)(f) indicates that only the last 
of these contracts would be excluded from the category of 
"controlled credit contract". Why this should be so is not 
readily apparent if it is accepted that people borrowing 
$250,000 or more, whether by one, or a series of credit 
contracts, are still capable of looking after themselves! 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. For the reasons given above, it is submitted that the 
correct interpretation of section 15(1)(f) is that a credit 
contract is excluded from the definition of "controlled 
credit contract" if the following conditions are met: 
(a) at least $250,000 is advanced when the contract 
is made; or 
(b) at least $250,000 will definitely be advanced 
[in a single drawdown or in multiple 
drawdowns] at some time after the contract is 
made; 
( c) if there are already one or more credit contracts 
between the same creditor and debtor, and the 
amount of credit outstanding is less than 
$250,000 and a new contract is then entered 
into which raises the level of credit to $250,000 
or more then only the last of these contracts 
would fall within the exclusion contained in 
section 15(l)(f). 
2. In respect of conclusions (a) and (b) above the fact 
that the level of credit outstanding sub equently falls 
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below $250,000 would not necessitate the 
reclassification of a credit contract as a controlled 
credit contract such that the disclosure provisions of 
Part II of the Act would apply. 
In relation to conclusion ( c ), this conclusion holds 
only in respect of the contract that takes the credit 
outstanding over the $250,000 level, and, ipso facto, 
all subsequent credit contracts between the parties. 
In my view these propositions are supported by an 
interpretation of the Act, by the legal literature available, by 
the mechanisms utilised in overseas legislation to distinguish 
consumer credit transactions from commercial transactions, 
and by an application of common-sense, bearing in mind the 
aims, objectives and policies which the Act was intended to 
implement. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is clear that there is a level of uncertainty in relation to the 
correct interpretation of section 15(1)(f). 
For the reasons given in this paper I recommend that the 
section be amended to make it clear that if at least $250,000 
[ or some other appropriate figure] is to be advanced under 
the contract, regardless of whether at some point the amount 
of credit outstanding drops below $250,000 [or some other 
appropriate figure], then the contract should be excluded 
from the category of "controlled credit contract" and the 
disclosure requirements in Part II of the Act should not 
apply. 
If there are a number of credit contracts involved and the 
$250,000 limit is exceeded then the exemption should be 
applied to all such contracts, not just the one which tips the 
total over $250,000, and all subsequent contract . 
16 
(b) 
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The necessity to disclose to guarantors 
The recent case of Feltex Modular Carpets Pty Limited v. 
Day and Another16 has reignited the issue of whether the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981 requires disclosure to be made, 
under s.16, to guarantors of debts owing under controlled 
credit contracts. Unfortunately, Feltex has not clarified the 
law and authoritatively settled the considerable divergence of 
judicial opinion concerning this issue. 
Discussed below are the cases, including Feltex, which have 
considered this question. In general, these cases have failed 
to distinguish adequately between two separate questions: 
whether a guarantee can be, or can be part of, a 
controlled credit contract; and 
whether disclosure should be made to a guarantor who 
is not a debtor for the purposes of the Credit Contracts 
Act. 
While the answer to the first question is, at least sometimes, 
"yes", the answer to the second question, is "no". Those 
cases in which the answer to the second question has been 
given as "yes" have failed to distinguish the two questions 
defined above, and appear to have decided that disclosure is 
required to guarantors because the guarantees concerned 
have been (part of) credit contracts regardless of whether the 
guarantors under those guarantees have also fallen under the 
definition of a "debtor" contained in the Act. 
It is clear from the Act, however, that a guarantor is not the 
same thing as a debtor. Both terms are separately defined in 
section 2 of the Act: 
"Debtor", in relation to a credit contract, means a 
person to whom credit is, or is to be, provided 
(1992) 4 NZBLC 102 649 (Master Williams) 
37 
pursuant to the contract; and, except in section 16 of 
this Act, if the rights of such a person are transferred 
by assignment (whether absolutely or by way of 
mortgage) or operation of law, includes the person for 
the time being entitled to those rights: 
"Guarantor", in relation to a credit contract, means a 
person who guarantees the performance of a debtor's 
obligations under the contract, or who indemnifies a 
creditor against any loss which he may incur in 
respect of that contract, or who assumes liability for 
performing the obligations of a debtor under the 
contract; and "guarantee" has a corresponding 
mearung. 
As can be seen, a debtor is defined in section 2 as, 
essentially, a person to whom credit is or is to be provided. 
A guarantor, on the other hand, is defined as a person who 
guarantees the performance of a debtor's obligations or who 
indemnifies a creditor against any loss. Guarantors and 
debtors are, therefore, clearly distinguished by the Act. 
A debtor is not defined as someone who owes money under a 
credit contract, a definition which could arguably include a 
guarantor. Rather, a debtor is defined as a person to whom 
credit is provided, which does not, (at least ordinarily) 
include a guarantor of a third party's debt obligations; 
Sections 16 to 19 provide for four different forms of 
disclosure (in turn, initial, modification, continuing (in 
relation to revolving credit contracts) and request disclosure). 
Under ss.16 to 18, disclosure is required to be made "to every 
debtor for the time being". Request disclosure under section 
19, however, must be made to any "debtor or guarantor" who 
so requests. The disclosure provisions themselves, therefore, 
explicitly distinguish between disclosure to debtors and 
disclosure to guarantors. 
17 
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What the Law Is 
Despite this clear statutory dichotomy between debtors and 
guarantors, however, some judges have interpreted the Act to 
require disclosure to guarantors in situations beyond those 
where a request for disclosure has been made by a guarantor 
under section 19. 
In UDC Finance Limited v. Lloyd 17 the plaintiff, a finance 
company, sued the first defendant and the second defendant 
in respect of an advance made by the plaintiff to the econd 
defendant on 20 December 1985. Summary judgment was 
entered against both defendants for the sum claimed plus 
interest and costs. The claim against the first defendant was 
based on his guarantee of the second defendant's loan. The 
loan was made to enable the second defendant to purchase an 
aircraft from the first defendant's company. The second 
defendant gave an Instrument by way of Security over the 
aircraft to the plaintiff. The loan moneys were paid by the 
plaintiff to the first defendant by direction of the second 
defendant, to effect the second defendant's purchase of the 
first defendant's aircraft. 
Following the entry of judgment the first defendant filed an 
application to set aside the summary judgment on the 
grounds, inter alia, that the contract of guarantee was 
"invalidly disclosed" to the first defendant contrary to 
sections 16 and 20 of the Credit Contracts Act 1981 and the 
Second Schedule thereto. 
Wylie J. held that disclosure was not required to be made to a 
guarantor. However, he based this conclusion on his finding 
that a guarantee is not a credit contract within the meaning of 
the Act, from which his Honour concluded that it followed 
that no disclosure was required because disclosure only has 
to be made in relation to a credit contract which is a 
controlled credit contract. However, it is submitted that thi 
Unreported. CP 297/86, Auckland Registry, 16.9.86 
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analysis fails to clearly distinguish between the two separate 
questions identified above; whether a guarantee is a credit 
contract, or, together with other documents, is a credit 
contract, and whether a guarantor is a debtor, as defined in 
the Act. 
Wylie J. gave five reasons for his conclusion that disclosure 
was not required to be made to the guarantor in this case: 
1. "Apart from such artificialities as may be imposed by 
virtue of the statutory definition, a guarantee is not a 
contract for credit in the ordinary and natural sense of 
those terms" .18 
Though this is correct, it is submitted that the 
ordinary and natural sense of terms which are 
explicitly defined in a statute should not take priority 
over those definitions, particularly in the case of a 
highly technical piece of legislation like the Credit 
Contracts Act. 
2. The "natural meaning" of section 3(l)(a), which give 
one definition of "credit contract", is that "the 
provision of money or money's worth is a provision to 
the person who makes the promise to pay rather than 
to some third party".19 
With respect, the wording of section 3(l)(a) is, on a 
literal reading, sufficiently wide to encompass 
contracts in which the credit is provided to a person 
other than the person promising to "repay" it. On this 
literal reading of section 3(l)(a) a contract of 
guarantee could be said to fall within the definition of 
"credit contract" in section 3(l)(a). However, this is 
only the first obstacle. The second obstacle is that the 
guarantor must also come within the Act's definition 
Supran.17,atp. 17 
Supran.17, atp. 17 
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of a "debtor". In general it will be unlikely that a 
guarantor will be a person to whom credit is, or is to 
be provided under the credit contract, so as to be able 
to fall within the Act's definition of "debtor". 
3. Under s.3(l)(a), the promise by "another person" to 
pay must be "in respect of the provision" of money or 
money's worth. However, his Honour stated that "the 
promise to pay of a guarantor is not so much in 
respect of the provision of money or money's worth to 
the principal debtor, as in respect of the default of the 
principal debtor" .20 
This is a somewhat technical argument, which sits 
oddly alongside the "ordinary and natural sense of 
[those] words" type of argument raised in relation to 
the first head of argument, but is strictly correct. 
Under an ordinary guarantee (i.e. a guarantee in which 
the guarantor is not deemed to also be a principal 
debtor) a guarantor is, strictly, liable not as a debtor 
but in damages for breach of their guarantee that the 
debt would be paid when due. By contrast, under 
guarantees in which guarantors are also deemed to be 
principal debtors, guarantors agree to pay the debt if 
and when called upon by the creditor to do so (and 
regardless of whether the person to whom the funds 
have been provided has had demand for repayment 
made upon them and failed to do so), and are therefore 
primarily liable in an action for debt and not (at least 
initially) for damages under an action in contract for 
breach of guarantee. However, this distinction should 
be irrelevant under the Credit Contracts Act, because 
the Act provides definitions of "debtor", "guarantor" 
and "credit contract". 
Furthermore, in signalling this distinction, Wylie J. 
anticipated a line of authority which would later result 
Supra n.17, atpp 17 and 18 
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in two judges finding that disclosure must be made to 
guarantors who are also deemed to be principal 
debtors under these guarantee contracts. 
It is submitted that this approach is misconceived in 
the context of whether disclosure is required to be 
made to a guarantor, which should be determined 
solely by reference to whether the contract of 
guarantee, alone, or together with other documents, is 
properly described as a (controlled) credit contract 
and, if so, whether the guarantor/principal debtor also 
falls within the definition of "debtor" contained in the 
Act, i.e. is a person who is, or is to be, provided with 
credit pursuant to the (controlled credit) contract. 
4. Disclosure under section 16 is only required to be 
made to every "debtor", and the definition of "debtor" 
in section 2 "on its face does not include a guarantor". 
As discussed above, it is submitted that this is a 
correct analysis. 
5. "Guarantor" is defined in section 2 in such a way that 
"a clear distinction is made between a debtor and a 
guarantor". 
Again, it is submitted that this is a correct analysis of 
the Act. 
While it is submitted that Wylie J. arrived at the correct 
answer - i.e. that initial disclosure need not be made under 
section 16 to a guarantor who does not fall within the Act's 
definition of a "debtor", - that part of his Honour's reasoning 
which deals with whether a guarantee is a credit contract, and 
the distinction between those guarantee which al o deem the 
guarantor to be a principal debtor, and those which do not, is, 
with respect, either incorrect or strictly irrelevant. 
21 
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In Jenkins v. NZI Finance Limited21 Tompkins J. found that 
not only was the mortgage, in respect of which the guarantee 
concerned had been given, not a credit contract, but, 
furthermore, that guarantors were only entitled to disclosure 
under section 19 (request disclosure) and not entitled to 
initial disclosure pursuant to section 16. 
Mr and Mrs Jenkins had executed a mortgage over their 
home property to secure the personal guarantee given by Mr 
Jenkins to the defendant (NZI Finance) in respect of 
commercial loan facilities provided to several of Mr Jenkins' 
companies. When the companies proved unable to meet the 
payments required under the facilities, NZI Finance sought to 
enforce the mortgage over the Jenkins' home property by 
exercising the power of sale contained in the mortgage. The 
Jenkins sought an injunction against NZI Finance to prevent 
the power of sale being exercised. One of the grounds put 
forward by the Jenkins in support of the injunction was that 
the mortgage over the home property was a controlled credit 
contract, within section 15 of the Credit Contracts Act 1981, 
and that NZI Finance had not made the disclosure documents 
required by section 21 in respect of initial disclosure under 
section 16 available to Mr and Mrs Jenkins. 
After deciding that the mortgage was not a controlled credit 
contract, because the exception contained in section 15(1)(f) 
of the Act applied, his Honour went on to state22 : 
Supra n.13 
There is another reason why the initial disclosure 
provisions in s.16 do not apply to the mortgage. That 
section requires initial disclosure to be made to every 
debtor. The March facility evidenced a credit 
contract. As defined in s.2. "debtor" in relation to a 
credit contract. means a person to whom credit is. or is 
to be provided. pursuant to the contract. That person 
was MB Jenkins Limited. The mortgage itself was 
Supra n.13, at pp 43-45 
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not a credit contract. It wa • a the March facility 
make clear. a charge to ecure the personal covenant 
of Mr Jenkin . So the mortgagor under the mortgage 
were not debtor a defined in .2. [ and were 
therefore not entitled to di clo ure] 
Section 2 define "guarantor" in relation to a credit 
contract, a meaning a per on who guarantee the 
performance of a debtor's obligation under the 
contract, or who indernnifie a creditor again t an 
loss which he may incur in re pect of that contract. or 
who assume liability for performing the obligation 
of a debtor under the contract. 
Clearly, Mr Jenkin wa a guarantor. He guaranteed 
the performance of MB Jenkin Limited. under the 
credit contract e idenced by the March facility . 
....... A guarantor i entitled to reque t di clo ure, 
pursuant to s.19. But a guarantor i not entitled to 
initial di clo ure pur uant to .16. There i no 
suggestion that any obligation for reque t di clo ure 
has been breached. There ha been no reque t. For 
thi rea on al o. I am ati fied that ZI wa under no 
obligation to make initial di clo ure [to the 
mortgagor] either at the time of the March facility, or 
at the time of the execution of the mortgage on 8 May 
1986. (Emphasi added) 
It i ubmitted that Tompkin J ha confu ed the two i ue 
of: 
1. whether the mortgage wa a (or part of a) credit 
contract, and 
2. if the mortgage wa a ( or part of a) credit contract, 
whether the mortgagor wa properly de cribed a a 
"debtor" or a "guarantor". 
23 
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In Jenkins it appears that a strong case could be advanced for 
finding that the mortgage and the guarantee formed part of a 
credit contract, by virtue of sections 3(l)(b) and 4(1)(b)(ii) 
(and in relation to section 4(1)(b)(ii), on the assumption that 
the commercial loan facility documents contained the usual 
"further assurances" clause, whereby the borrower agrees to 
execute or procure the execution of such further or other 
documents as the lender requires to better secure the loan 
advances made to the company). However, even if this was 
the case, it seems clear that Mr and Mrs Jenkins would not 
have been "debtors" and thus eligible for disclosure, because 
the funds were not advanced to them but to the company 
M.B. Jenkins Limited. 
The forensic waters were further muddied that same year by 
Gault J. in Elia v. Commercial and Mortgage Nominees Ltd 
and Others23 . In Elia the Court was again required to 
consider the meaning of the term "credit contract". The 
plaintiff, in consideration of a loan being made by the 
defendant to a third party pursuant to a debenture, executed a 
guarantee in favour of the defendant, together with a 
mortgage over his home property as security for that 
guarantee. 
The plaintiff contended that the mortgage was, by reason of 
its terms, "oppressive" within the meaning of s.9 of the Act. 
To obtain the required jurisdiction the Court first had to 
determine whether the mortgage was a credit contract. 
The defendant's counsel argued that the nature of the 
mortgage should be determined by considering its substance 
other than its form and so should be seen as being simply a 
mortgage providing security for the guarantee, and therefore, 
on the basis of Wylie J's finding in Lloyd24 that a guarantee 
does not constitute a "credit contract", ( and also, presumably 
(1988) 2 NZBLC 103 296 
Supra n.17 
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supported by Tompkins J's finding in Jenkins that the 
mortgage was a security document only and therefore not a 
credit contract) the mortgage would not be a "credit contract" 
within the meaning of the Act. 
Referring to the reasons against disclosure advanced in 
Lloyd, his Honour concluded that the arguments were of a 
purely technical nature, and flew in the face of the express 
terms of the documents that he was considering. In 
particular, the debenture (which contained the guarantee 
clause) deemed Mr Elia to be a "principal debtor". Gault J. 
therefore distinguished the case before him from Lloyd on 
the grounds that Wylie J. did not appear to have had in 
contemplation a guarantee covenant that went further than a 
strict guarantee and also imposed the obligation of principal 
debtor on the covenantor. 
Thus the distinction apparently drawn by Wylie J. in Lloyd, 
but not relied upon by him as a rationale for requiring 
disclosure, was used by Gault J to require disclosure of a 
controlled credit contract to a guarantor deemed by the 
guarantee contract to be also a principal debtor. 
It is worth noting that the guarantor was the first defendant in 
Lloyd, the original debtor the second defendant. While it is 
not clear from the text of the judgment, therefore, it is quite 
possible that the guarantee document at issue in Lloyd did 
contain a clause deeming the guarantor to be a principal 
debtor. 
Gault J. suggested two alternative routes whereby the 
debenture ( containing the guarantee clause) and the mortgage 
over the house property, which was given to secure the 
guarantee obligations contained in the debenture, could 
together constitute a credit contract. 
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Both section 3( 4) and section 4( 1 )(b) provide, in different 
ways, for a series of documents together to constitute a credit 
contract. 
Gault J felt that Wylie J's comments in Lloyd were 
confinable to a simple guarantee and were not to be extended 
to the form of covenant that goes further and imposes the 
obligations of principal debtor upon the covenantor. His 
Honour concluded that the plaintiff was a principal debtor 
under both the debenture and the mortgage, and on their face, 
both documents clearly fell within the definition of "credit 
contract" in s.3 of the Act. 
While this conclusion is susceptible to several differing 
interpretations, it is submitted that it would not have been 
appropriate to find that the debenture and mortgage each 
formed a separate contract. His Honour appeared to 
recognise this by stating that this was a situation that came 
within s.3( 4) of the Act, which provides that where by virtue 
of any arrangement there is a transaction that is in substance 
or effect a credit contract, the arrangements shall, for the 
purpose of the Act, be deemed to be a credit contract. 
Section 3( 4) provides that: 
[ w ]here, by virtue of any contract or contracts (none 
of which by itself constitutes a credit contract) or any 
arrangement, there is a transaction that is in substance 
or effect a credit contract, the contract, contracts, or 
arrangement shall for the purposes of this Act be 
deemed to be a credit contract.. ... 
It is submitted that this reasoning is questionable in this case. 
The debenture itself could clearly alone constitute a credit 
contract, and so s.3(4) could not be relied upon. Where there 
are written contracts then it would not appear to be open to 
the Court to rely on the alternative route to finding the 
existence of "substance or effect" credit contract by finding 
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that there was an arrangement. It is submitted that the two 
routes are mutually exclusive, as evidenced by the 
disjunctive "or" in the section. 
His Honour also concluded that he was satisfied that it was a 
term of the overall arrangement that the mortgage be entered 
into, so that the mortgage and the debenture together formed 
the credit contract by virtue of s.4(1)(b) of the Act. It is 
submitted that this part of His Honour's analysis is, however, 
correct. 
Section 4( 1 )(b) provides: 
Where it is a term of a credit contract that another 
contract or a deed be entered into, the following 
provisions shall apply: 
(a) 
(b) If the other contract or deed is to be entered 
into for the purposes of giving security for the 
credit provided under the credit contract -
(i) The whole of that other contract or deed 
shall be deemed to form part of the 
credit contract for the purposes of this 
Act (whether or not it is entered into at 
the same time as the credit contract is 
made); and 
(ii) For the purposes of Part II of this Act, 
the credit contract shall be deemed to be 
made when the other contract or deed is 
made or the credit is provided pursuant 
to the credit contract (whichever is the 
earlier). 
Also, his Honour's view was that section 3(1)(a), (b) and (c) 
should not be read as limited to situations in which the loan 
or forbearance is necessarily made to the person providing 
25 
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the promise by way of consideration (that is, contrary to the 
interpretation favoured by Wylie J. in Lloyd). His Honour 
stated that section 3(1)(a), (b) and (c) seem to have been 
drawn specifically to avoid any necessary identity between 
the person to whom the loan or promise of forbearance is 
given and the person making the promise to repay or procure 
the repayment. 
While such a construction is considered to be correct, 
arguably s.3(1) can never include stand-alone guarantees in 
themselves. A stand-alone guarantee, it could be argued, will 
only form part of a credit contract if an all-encompassing 
definition of the term "credit contract" is adopted, thus 
allowing all loan and security documentation executed in 
connection with the provision of money or money's worth to 
be regarded collectively as the credit contract, or by virtue of 
s.4(1), or, possibly, s.3(4). 
This aspect was recognised by Williamson J in Westpac 
Banking Corporation v Morris25 where counsel argued that a 
stand alone guarantee could not come within the provisions 
of s.3 of the Act. His Honour noted: 
"Certainly the indication in these documents is that the 
guarantee was being given in relation to the affairs of 
the customer company and the probabilities are that 
other re-arrangements, advances or agreement to 
continue advances or not to pursue remedies were 
being discussed or implemented at the same time. It is 
most unlikely that the Defendant was merely attending 
at the Bank's premises in order to sign the guarantee 
without such guarantee being part of other 
transactions or agreements." 
An alternative argument is that a stand-alone guarantee 
(whether of the "simple" guarantee kind or the type of 
guarantee where the guarantor is also deemed to be a 
Unreported. CP 269/87, Dunedin Registry, 28.4.87 
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principal debtor) could fall within the literal words of the 
section 3( 1 )(b) definition, even though, at least in the case of 
a "simple" guarantee, the promise to pay or procure payment 
is efffectively based on a contingency, i.e. that the person to 
whom the credit is extended is unable or unwilling to repay 
after demand has been made on him or her, and the "simple" 
guarantor's liability is secondary to the debtor's primary 
liability. There is nothing in the section which precludes 
reliance on such a contingency. Indeed, section 3(2) 
specifically provides that the term "promise", as used in 
section 3(1 ), includes a conditional promise. 
It is submitted that this is the better view, and that therefore, 
in many cases, a stand-alone guarantee may be classified as a 
credit contract under section 3(1 )(b ), even though the person 
making the promise to repay will, invariably be a "guarantor" 
(as defined in section 2), and not a "debtor", (as defined in 
section 2) and not therefore someone to whom disclosure 
under sections 16, 17 or 18 has to be made. 
Even though the interpretation placed on section 3(1) by 
Gault J. is to be preferred to that of Wylie Jin Lloyd, the fact 
that a guarantee may be, or form part of, a credit contract 
does not mean that the Act automatically requires disclosure 
to be made to a guarantor, when that guarantor is deemed by 
the terms of the particular contract to be a "principal debtor". 
It is not sufficient to claim merely that arguments to the 
contrary are "of a technical nature" and "fly in the face of 
express terms of the documents". Disclosure under sections 
16, 17 and 18 is only required to be made to persons who fall 
within the Act's definition of "debtor". It is not sufficient to 
require disclosure that a guarantee ( or other document) 
deems the guarantor to be a principal debtor, if that person 
cannot be interpreted to fall within the statutory definition of 
"debtor". 
26 
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This was specifically recognised by Thorpe J. in Stewart and 
Another v. Westpac Banking Corporation Limited26. His 
Honour expressly agreed with the conclusions reached by 
Wylie J. in Lloyd and by Tompkins J. in Jenkins that the 
Act's distinction between debtors and guarantors proceeds on 
the basis, apparent particularly from the definitions of those 
terms in section 2, that debtors are persons "to whom credit is 
or is to be provided" and accordingly that guarantors are not 
persons to whom disclosure is required by section 16(2). 
Disagreeing with the views expressed by Gault J. in Elia, 
Thorpe J. concluded that the common provision in guarantees 
that a guarantor shall for the purposes of the contract be 
deemed to be a principal debtor, did not automatically 
convert that guarantor into a "debtor" for the purposes of the 
Credit Contracts Act. 
The judicial debate over disclosure has continued with the 
most recent case to consider this question - Feltex Modular 
Carpets Pty Limited v. Day.21 
To ensure continuing supplies from Feltex to their company 
Star Flooring Limited, Mr and Mrs Day entered into a deed 
under which they guaranteed the due and punctual payment 
of all monies currently owing and owed in the future by Star 
Flooring to Feltex in accordance with an annexed payment 
schedule. Under this deed of guarantee, Mr and Mrs Day 
were deemed to be principal debtors viz a viz Feltex, as 
creditor. The schedule showed the amount of debt due and 
added bank fees on a dishonour and interest on the reducing 
balance at 20%. No disclosure was made by Feltex in 
respect of the deed. 
In response to Mr and Mrs Day's claim, in defence to Feltex's 
claim for summary judgment against them under the 
guarantee, that the deed was unenforceable by virtue of non 
Unreported. CP 1883/90, Auckland Registry, 24.7.91 
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disclosure, Feltex argued that the original contracts for 
supply together with the guarantee did not come within the 
definition of "credit contract". This, however, was rejected 
by Master Williams on the grounds that the guarantee was a 
contract under which Feltex agreed to forebear from 
requiring payment of the money due to it in consideration of 
the promise by Mr and Mrs Day to pay or procure the 
payment in the future and in respect of the forbearance a sum 
of money which exceeded the amount of the original debt by 
the addition of bank fees and interest. The arrangement was 
thus considered by his Honour to be clearly a credit contract 
under section 3(l)(b). 
Master Williams held that it was tolerably plain that true 
guarantees - as opposed to documents making persons 
signing them principal debtors - did not clearly come within 
the definition of a credit contract. His Honour concluded that 
guarantees are clearly not within section 3(1)(a). Their 
relationship to section 3(1)(b) however, was regarded by him 
as being a little more obscure, because the phrase "another 
person" might be capable of extending to a guarantor. 
However, his Honour was of the view that if the legislature 
intended this, it could have provided so explicitly, 
particularly since "guarantor" is defined in section 2 and a 
clear distinction is drawn between debtors and guarantors in 
the disclosure provisions in section 16 to 19. 
Despite this explicit recognition of the distinction between 
debtors and guarantors, however, Master Williams went on 
to conclude that disclosure was required to be made to 
guarantors who were principal debtors. After quoting 
extensively from both Lloyd and Jenkins, as well as referring 
to Stewart, Master Williams quoted extensively from Elia, in 
particular the passage in which Gault J. distinguished Lloyd 
on the grounds that the guarantor in Lloyd was not a 
principal debtor. 
28 
52 
In applying these deci ions (concerning which he remarked 
that there currently appeared to be a difference of judicial 
view), Master Williams suggested that one point of possible 
distinction between those cases and the one before him wa 
that unlike the case before him the earlier deci ion all 
appeared to have dealt with guarantees executed 
contemporaneously with the initial provision of credit and 
with guarantees which formed part of the initial ecurity 
documents, thus leading to a consideration of the effect of 
section 3(4). In fact, only Elia con idered the effect of 
section 3( 4 ). 
It appears, however, that his Honour's concern was to 
distinguish cases in which guarantees had been held not to 
form (part of) credit contracts from the ea e before him on 
the grounds that Feltex's forbearance, in consideration of the 
giving of the guarantee, clearly brought the guarantee within 
section 3(l)(b). 
His Honour stated:28 
In the circumstances of this matter, the fu t question 
is whether the document of November 1989 [i.e. the 
deed of guarantee with annexed repayment Schedule] 
comes within the definition of a "credit contract". 
It was clearly a new contract entered into between 
Feltex and Mr and Mrs Day under which they agreed 
both to pay the amount of Star Flooring's debt and to 
pay interest and bank fees already charged by Feltex 
to Star Floorings and future intere ton the 
diminishing balance. It was expressed to be made in 
consideration of Feltex's supply of goods to Star 
Floorings and its forbearance from suing that 
company. It is therefore a contract under which 
Feltex agreed to forbear from requiring payment of the 
money due to it by Star Floorings in consideration of 
Supra n.27, at 102, 653 
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the promise by Mr and Mrs Day to pay or procure the 
payment in the future and in respect of the forbearance 
a sum of money which exceeded the amount of the 
original debt by the addition of bank fees and interest 
up to November 1989 and interest thereafter. That, in 
this Court's view, brings the November 1989 contract 
squarely within the definition of a "credit contract" in 
s.3(1) and, in addition, the arrangement is in substance 
a credit contract and thus also falls within s.3(4) . 
And further: 29 
When those authorities [i.e. Lloyd, Jenkins, Elia] are 
applied to the facts of this case to consider whether 
the November 1989 document comes within the 
definition of "credit contract" it is to be borne in mind 
that one point of possible distinction between the 
cases earlier discussed and this case is that they all 
appear to have dealt with guarantees executed 
contemporaneously with the initial provision of credit 
and with guarantees which formed part of the initial 
security documents, thus leading to a consideration of 
the effect of s.3(4) as well as s.3(1)(a)(b). 
Such is not the case here. This case is concerned with 
a contract pursuant to which Mr and Mrs Day each 
undertook a new and direct personal liability to Feltex 
for the existing debt owed to Feltex by Star Floorings 
plus payment of the interest for which the November 
1989 agreement provided, their assumption of that 
liability being expressed to be in consideration for 
Feltex's forbearance from suing Star Floorings. In this 
Court's view, seen in that light, the November 1989 
document comes within the definition of "credit 
contract" in s.3(1)(b). 
Supra n.27, at 102, 655 
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In addition, the November 1989 document imposes an 
obligation for interest and bank fees on Mr and Mrs 
Day in addition to the debt then owed to Feltex by 
Star Floorings. Arguably, therefore, the November 
1989 contract is "in substance or effect a credit 
contract" and is therefore deemed to be a "credit 
contract" pursuant to s.3( 4 ). 
However, as has been discussed above, whether a guarantee 
forms (part of) a credit contract is, for the purposes of 
disclosure, only the first part of the issue. For disclosure to 
be required there must first be a controlled credit contract. 
Such disclosure only has to be made to every "debtor" (as 
defined in the Act) for the time being under that controlled 
credit contract. 
Having found that the deed of guarantee was a credit contract 
under section 3(l)(b), and, together with the original sales 
dockets, also part of an arrangement which constituted a 
credit contract pursuant to section 3( 4 ), Master Williams then 
proceeded to consider whether the 20% interest rate was "a 
reasonable amount payable upon default" within the terms of 
section 3(3)(b)(ii), which would have the effect of taking the 
arrangement out of the definition of "credit contract". As no 
evidence as to the reasonableness or otherwise had been 
presented to the Court, Master Williams felt unable to 
conclude that the bank fees and interest provisions fell within 
this exclusion. The contract was thus a credit contract 
because the 20% interest was properly classified as a charge 
for credit rather than liquidated damages for default. 
The final question was whether the credit contract was a 
"controlled credit contract" under section 15(l)(a). This 
depended upon "whether or not Feltex came within the 
definition of "financier" in that section. A this was "a 
matter entirely within [Feltex's] knowledge", and Feltex had 
chosen not to exercise its right of reply in this matter, Master 
Willliams concluded that Feltex had failed to satisfy the 
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Court that it was not a financier and that the guarantee was 
not a controlled credit contract. 
Master Williams therefore concluded that there was an 
obligation on Feltex to give initial disclosure to Mr and Mrs 
Day in accordance with sections 16, 20 and the Second 
Schedule to the Act. That is, the guarantee was (part of) a 
controlled credit contract, and controlled credit contracts 
require disclosure. As this disclosure had not been given, 
Feltex was unable to enforce the guarantee and its application 
for summary judgment was therefore dismissed. 
It is submitted that this result is incorrect. Whether or not a 
guarantee is (part of) a controlled credit contract is a separate 
(and preliminary) question from whether disclosure is 
required to be made to guarantors. The Act is clear in 
distinguishing debtors and guarantors and requiring 
disclosure only to the former. Though Mr and Mrs Day 
clearly undertook a direct and primary obligation under the 
guarantee document to repay the advances made to Star 
Flooring, the mere assumption of this primary liability could 
not convert them into "debtors", as defined in section 2, i.e. 
persons to whom credit is, or is to be provided. The credit 
was provided to Star Flooring alone. 
If, however, the original rights of Star Flooring as debtor had 
been assigned to Mr and Mrs Day, with Feltex's consent, by 
Star Flooring, or the loan facility to Star Flooring had been 
novated so that Mr and Mrs Day stepped into the shoes of 
Star Flooring, then clearly Mr and Mrs Day would have been 
"debtors" under the section 2 definition, and therefore 
entitled to disclosure. They would have been persons to 
whom credit was provided. However, it is clear from the 
guarantee document that there was no assignment of Star 
Flooring's rights and obligations a debtor or any novation 
whereby Mr and Mrs Day undertook for the future, the rights 
and obligations of Star Flooring. Though the guarantee 
document deemed Mr and Mrs Day to be principal debtors 
30 
31 
32 
33 
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viz a viz Feltex, Star Flooring, and Star Flooring alone, was 
the legal entity to which credit was provided. 
Conclusions 
It is submitted that the results reached by Wylie J in Lloyd30 
and Tomkins Jin Jenkins31 are to be preferred to those 
reached by Gault J in Elia, 32 and Master Williams in Feltex. 33 
Whilst in Elia and Feltex the mortgage and guarantee 
documents, respectively, may well have referred to the 
plaintiff being liable as a "principal debtor", it does not 
automatically follow that the plaintiff was a "debtor" in terms 
of the Act - he was not the person to whom credit was 
provided. Disclosure is only required to a debtor - and that 
definition is determined by s.2 and not solely by reference to 
the wording used in the contract between the lender and the 
guarantor. 
Care needs to be taken to properly determine what 
documents constitute "the credit contract" , and the nature of 
the rights and obligations undertaken by the various parties to 
those documents before a decision can be made to whom 
disclosure is required. This decision is, in the final event, a 
determination which must be made strictly in accordance 
with the terms of the Credit Contracts Act. 
As has been demonstrated above, it is not enough that a 
guarantee document which on its own, or together with other 
documents, is a credit contract deems the guarantor to be a 
principal debtor viz a viz the creditor. For disclosure to be 
required the "principal debtor" must, on a proper construction 
of the document or documents forming the controlled credit 
contract, and a proper analysis of the transaction or 
transactions which they describe, be able to be described as 
Supra n.17 
Supra n.21 
Supra n.23 
Supra n.16 
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"a person to whom credit is, or is to be, provided" pursuant to 
the credit contract in question. 
It is submitted that in none of the cases analysed above could 
the guarantors be aptly so described, such as to justify a 
conclusion that they were "debtors" in terms of the Act and 
therefore persons to whom disclosure should have been 
made. 
From a creditor's perspective, given the confused state of the 
law and the current lack of any Court of Appeal judgment on 
the issue, it is highly advisable for disclosure to be made by 
creditors to all guarantors who are deemed to be "principal 
debtors" in respect of guarantees which alone, or together 
with other financial arrangements, are likely to constitute 
"controlled credit contracts" under the Act. 
From a guarantor's perspective, the currently unsettled state 
of the law will be advantageous where the guarantor is 
deemed by the contract of guarantee to be a principal debtor 
and where disclosure has not been made. If, for any reason, 
a guarantor wished to ensure that disclosure was made under 
the Act, whether or not they were deemed to be principal 
debtors, they could attempt to negotiate a clause to be 
included in the contract of guarantee deeming them to be a 
debtor under a controlled credit contract, for the purposes of 
the Credit Contracts Act 1981 and thus eligible for 
disclosure. However, given the realities of the credit market 
place, it is suggested that rarely, if ever, will a prospective 
debtor be able to negotiate successfully on this issue. 
While this technique could not convert a guarantor into a 
debtor, in terms of the definition in the Credit Contracts Act, 
if he or she would not otherwise meet the definition, there 
would at least be a contractually enforceable right to the 
same level of disclosure as a "debtor" under the Act and 
would also expose a creditor, who fails to disclose, to the 
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same sanctions for non-disclosure as would apply under the 
Act. 
By this technique a guarantor could obtain the same 
protection, by contract, as a "debtor" would enjoy by statute. 
Should guarantors be equated with debtors for the purposes 
of the disclosure requirements of the Act? 
A compelling case can be made for requiring disclosure 
under the Act to debtors and guarantors in the same 
circumstances. While the "credit-shopping" rationale does 
not, by its terms, apply to guarantors, a guarantor is critically 
interested in knowing exactly what obligations he or she is 
guaranteeing. A guarantor must be able to accurately assess 
the ability of the debtor that they are guaranteeing to meet 
their obligations to repay that debt and the associated credit 
changes. An extension of the disclosure regime to guarantors 
would ensure that accurate information on the repayment 
obligations of debtors was supplied to guarantors so that they 
could assess the commercial risk (in commercial situations) 
of guaranteeing the debt. Clearly, in family-type 
transactions, where guarantors will be prepared to act 
through "natural love and affection", or a feeling of moral 
obligation, this rationale will not apply with the same force, 
but it is submitted that this does not derogate from the force 
of the argument in favour of extending the benefits of 
disclosure to guarantors. 
This submission is reinforced by the fact that the penalties 
for failure to disclose which are contained in sections 25 to 
30 of the Act are available for the benefit of both debtors and 
guarantors, surely a legislative recognition that the 
consequences of a failure by a creditor to fulfil its disclosure 
obligations are of equal significance to both debtors and 
guarantors. 
Recommendations 
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( 1) It is recommended that the obligations imposed on 
creditors to disclose to debtors by virtue of sections 16 
and 17 of the Act be extended to guarantors by the 
addition of a reference to every "debtor and guarantor" 
in sections 16(2) and 17(2), and also by redrafting 
sections 16(2) and 17(2) to refer to the necessity to 
disclose to every debtor and guarantor under or in 
relation to the controlled credit contract. The addition 
of the words "or in relation to" should be sufficient to 
avoid the technical arguments and logical gymnastics 
encountered in the cases analysed above about 
whether guarantees can be brought within the 
definition of "credit contract" by recourse to section 
3(1), 3(4), 4(1), or a combination of these provisions. 
The addition of the words "in relation to" would make 
it clear that disclosure is required to a guarantor, 
whether or not the guarantee is, technically, part of a 
controlled credit contract. The redrafted sections 
16(2) and 17 (2) would thus read: 
16(2) In this Act the term "initial disclosure", 
in relation to a controlled credit contract, means 
disclosure of the contract to every debtor and 
guarantor for the time being under or in relation 
to the contract in accordance with section 20 of 
this Act. 
17(2) In this Act the term "modification 
disclosure", in relation to a modification 
contract, means disclosure of the modification 
contract to every debtor and guarantor for the 
time being under or in relation to the controlled 
credit contract to which the modification 
contract relates, in accordance with section 20 
of this Act. 
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(2) In relation to ection 18 disclo ure (continuing 
di clo ure of revolving credit contract) it i 
recommended that guarantors continue to have the 
choice of requesting regular periodic di closures 
(under section 19), but that continuing disclo ure 
under section 18 not be made mandatory in re pect of 
guarantors. The rationale for treating ection 18 
disclo ures differently from section 16 and 17 
disclosures is that by far the bulk of controlled credit 
contract covered by section 18 will be credit card 
contracts. Rather than automatically put a creditor to 
the expense of routinely sending out duplicate 
statements it is recommended that a guarantor hould 
be left to rely on his or her rights to disclosure under 
section 19 (disclosure on request). 
(3) A related point is that the information pecified in Part 
IV of the Second Schedule to the Act, which i the 
information that a debtor or guarantor may reque t to 
be disclosed by virtue of section 19( a), refers to a 
period of 6 months previous to the request for 
disclosure within which the information reque ted and 
disclosed must be current (Part IV clau es 1 
(Outstanding amounts) and 2 (Finance rate under 
revolving credit contract)). Six months appear to be 
an unduly lenient period of time to extend to a creditor 
and it is recommended that, after consultation with 
banks and other major providers of "revolving" credit 
that, if appropriate, a period of 2 or 3 months should 
be substituted, or such lesser time as can reasonably 
be expected to be complied with. 
(4) Given the requirement in relation to revolving credit 
contracts in section 18(2) that the " pecified period" 
for upplying disclosure information in relation to a 
billing period of 3 months or less i that disclosure is 
to be made within 20 working day , it would seem to 
be appropriate that request disclosure to guarantors of 
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revolving credit contracts should also be premised on 
a more realistic period, such as the 3 months 
benchmark adopted by section 18(2). The writer's 
own experience has not led him to the acquaintance of 
a species of revolving credit contract, in relation to 
sums under $250,000, where bills are ubmitted to the 
debtor at greater than 3 monthly intervals. If the 
writer's experience holds true then section 18 should 
be amended to delete the definition of "specified 
period" contained in section 18(2) and also to 
substitute a reference in section 18(1) to "20 working 
days" for the reference to the "specified period". 
(5) Given the different approaches taken in the cases 
discussed above to the question of whether, pursuant 
to section 3(1 ), the person to whom, for example, 
money or money's worth is provided, must be the 
same person who promises to pay, or procure 
payment, in the future, of a greater sum, it is 
recommended that the current doubts be resolved by 
amending section 3 to reflect the approach to this 
issue taken in Elia and Feltex that, the "debtor", as 
defined in section 2, does not, for the purpose of 
section 3(1)(a)-(e), have to be the same person who 
also promises to pay, or procure the payment of, in the 
future a greater sum ( or, in relation to the discounting 
transactions contemplated by section 3(1)(f), a lower 
sum). 
Though this amendment will not be technically 
necessary to ensure that disclosure is made to every 
debtor and guarantor (if recommendation (1) above is 
implemented by inserting the "under or in relation to" 
amendment to sections 16(2) and 17(2)), it is 
submitted that the amendment is required to achieve 
consistency with the amendments recommended to 
section s16(2) and 17(2), and will also ensure that, in 
appropriate cases, mortgagors and guarantors will also 
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be able to take advantage directly of the reopening 
provisions contained in Part 1 of the Act without the 
necessity to navigate the complexities of sections 3( 4) 
and 4(1). 
(c) Section 3{3){b)(ii) 
Section 3(3 )(b )(ii) provides that for the purposes of 
determining whether a contract is a credit contract within the 
meaning of section 3, any reasonable amount payable as a 
result of a default under the contract by the promisor is not to 
be included as part of the sum or sums of money promised to 
be paid in future. In effect then, the subsection seeks to 
distinguish between liquidated damages, which form a 
genuine pre-estimate of loss as a result of a default by the 
other party under a contract, and ordinary credit charges. It 
is only if the amounts charged can truly be categorised as 
credit charges that the contract will be a credit contract, as 
defined in the Act. 
The section provides: 
For the purposes of determining whether a contract is 
a credit contract within the meaning of this section, -
(b) The following amounts shall not be included as 
part of the sum or sums of money promised to be paid 
in the future: 
(ii) Any reasonable amount payable as a 
result of a default under the contract by the 
prom1sor. 
This part of the paper will only deal with the "amount 
payable as a result of a default under the contract" limb of 
the sub-section. The question of the "reasonableness" of that 
amount will not be considered. 
34 
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Th mo t recent ea e to di cu thi 
Kettle Ltd v Duncan.34 
ue 1 William and 
Duncan entered into a contract with a tock and tation agent. 
The contract, de cribed a an "Application for Trading 
Account", pro ided Duncan with authorit to bu good on 
credit. The agreed period of credit varied depending on the 
type of good purcha ed, but payment wa u uall due one 
month from the date of upply. 
The contract provided that if full payment wa not made b 
the due date, compound intere t on the out tanding amount 
would be charged "at the rate from time to time determined 
by the Chief Executive of the company". The agreement 
contained detailed provi ion relating to payment of intere t, 
including the fact that the then applicable rate or rate of 
interest would be disclosed to Duncan on the monthly 
statement which he received. At the time of entering the 
contract Duncan was not offered the opportunity to gain 
independent legal advice. The agent also failed to di clo e 
the rate of credit payable under the contract. 
Duncan fell behind with a number of payment . The agent 
charged compound intere t of 25 %. Summary judgment wa 
sought by the agent and entered by consent. Duncan 
objected to the interest being claimed a he alleged that the 
non-disclosure of the rate of credit under the contract wa a 
breach of the Credit Contracts Act, thu prohibiting the agent 
from enforcing the interest provision. 
The agent argued that the interest provision was still 
enforceable despite the non-disclosure becau e the contract 
was an exception under s.3(l)(i) or 3(3)(b)(ii) to the 
definition of "credit contract" in the Act. 
In giving judgment in favour of Duncan, Ma ter William 
held that: 
(1991 ) 3 NZBLC 102,405 
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1. The contract was not one for the sale of property 
which merely provided for a penalty to be paid in the 
event of default. The contract gave the purchaser an 
option of paying cash when due or paying interest on 
the balance overdue. The contract was therefore not 
an exception to the Act under s.3(1)(i). 
(i) The contract stipulated that payment for the 
goods fell due in the month after supply. It 
also provided for what would happen if the 
purchaser failed to meet the due date. The 
parties to the contract did not originally 
contemplate the provision of prolonged credit. 
Swift payment of the whole was expected. 
(ii) Despite this, the substance of the contract was 
that Duncan had the option to pay for the goods 
in full on the due date or to pay more for the 
goods later. The description of the interest to 
be charged for late payment as liquidated 
damages did not bring the contract within the 
exception in s.3(3)(b)(ii). A court must be 
satisfied that the penalty charged for late 
payment under a contract is, in fact, a genuine 
statement as to liquidated damages which 
would be imposed for default. 
2. In the present circumstances the Court felt constrained 
by previous authorities to hold that the contract was 
not within the exception set out in s.3(3)(b)(ii). 
3. The contract was a controlled credit contract for 
which inadequate disclosure was made, and attracted 
the operation of sec.24 and 25 of the Act. 
4. Had previous authorities not been so firmly against a 
finding that the contract fell within the exception in 
35 
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s.3(3 )(b )(ii), the Court would have been willing to 
accept that the interest charged by the agent was, in 
this instance, a genuine pre-estimate of its damage. 
The amount charged was reasonable in light of the 
agent's circumstances and was al o in line with the 
amount charged by its competitors. It was therefore 
not unreasonable and the agent may also have been 
entitled to relief under sec 31 and 32 of the Act. 
His Honour decided that the contract was a controlled credit 
contract because, in his view, Williams and Kettle was a 
financier by virtue of paragraph (b), of the definition of 
"financier" (which provides that a financier includes any 
person who makes a practice of providing credit in the course 
of his business), and also by virtue of section (3)(l)(a): 35 
There can be little doubt that the trading account 
application is a contract for the provision of money, 
namely for "initial purchase of stock then 
merchandise", in consideration of Mr and Mrs 
Duncan's promise to pay for that stock and sums 
exceeding the cost of that stock by virtue of the 
provisions as to interest previously set out. 
It is also clear from the terms of the Long Title to the 
Act and the other provisions of the statute that it was 
intended by the legislature that the Credit Contract 
Act 1981 should be all-embracing unless persons 
contracting came clearly within the exceptions to the 
Statute. 
Given the nature of the agreement it would seem to have 
been more appropriate to describe the agreement as a 
contract for the provision of "money's worth" (i.e. purcha e 
of stock, then merchandise), rather than money, under 
section 3(l)(a). 
Supra n.34 at 102, 409 
66 
Having found that there was a controlled credit contract 
which, prima facie, required disclosure under the Act, Hi 
Honour then turned to consider36 whether the imposition of 
liquidated damages by way of interest should be excluded in 
considering whether the agreement was a "credit contract" by 
virtue of the provisions of s.3(3)(b )(ii), i.e. whether it is a 
"reasonable amount payable as a result of the default under 
the contract": 
The first aspect of s.3(3)(b)(ii) on which the Court's 
consideration requires to be focused is the phrase 
"default under the contract" and immediately it is to 
be noted that there is a difference of view expressed 
by the various Judges in the cases referred to, 
doubtless arising out of the different factual situations 
with which each was dealing. Gallen J in Mead, 
Vautier J in Italia Holdings, Holland J in Patrikios and 
Barker J in Turners Horticultural Supplies, all took the 
view that in the circumstances of their cases 
agreements to pay interest were not amounts payable 
as a result of a default ....... while Williamson J in 
McHaffie was concerned principally with the 
reasonableness of the amount charged although he did 
hold (at p. 101, 850) that the difference between 
Meade and McHaffie was that in the latter "there were 
no further discussions between the parties relating to 
interest" such as occurred in Mead. 
The contract between these parties makes it clear that 
payment for goods purchased falls due on the 20th of 
the month following supply and payment for livestock 
falls due on the 14th day following purchase (despite 
the contract also being sufficiently commercially 
realistic to provide for what happens in the event that 
the purchaser breaches the contract by failing to meet 
in full the debts owing on due date). Additionally, in 
36 Supra n.34 at 102, 415-416 
37 
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this particular case, it is clear from the factual 
circumstances reviewed in the judgment of 23 April 
and the findings made by the Court on that occasion 
that the parties to this transaction did not originally 
contemplate the provision by Williams & Kettle of 
prolonged credit. Swift payment of the whole of the 
debt was expected. 
In those circumstances. were it not for the 
preponderance of the authorities previously discussed. 
this Court might have been inclined to hold that Mr 
and Mrs Duncan have been in "default under the 
contract" for over a year but, despite Mr Dugdale's 
comment earlier cited, the main authorities where the 
question has been argued and which, factually, bear 
the closest resemblance to the facts of this matter 
indicate that such is not the case. The substance of the 
contract between Williams & Kettle and the Duncans 
was that the Duncans had the option of paying for the 
goods and livestock in full on due date or of paying 
more for the goods in consequence. that additional 
payment being by way of interest calculated in 
accordance with the contract even though the interest 
is described as liquidated damages. On the basis of 
those authorities, this Court feels constrained to hold 
that Williams & Kettle is not entitled to the exception 
set out in sec.3(3)(b)(ii). That view is fortified by the 
Long Title to the Act, the clear legislative intention 
that all contracts pursuant to which persons are 
required to repay more than the amount lent or the 
costs of the goods bought should come within the 
ambit of the Act, unless clearly excepted therefrom, 
and the provisions of sec.3(4). (Emphasis added) 
The reference to Dugdale37 is a reference to that author's 
commentary on ection 3(3)(b)(ii): 
Supra n.8 
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If the contract is expressed as one where interest is 
payable in default of prompt payment, then provided 
the amount is reasonable the transaction is outside the 
definition. 
This seems to offer a loophole; but the test of 
substantiality provided for in subsection ( 4) should not 
be overlooked. 
It is evident from the above discussion that Master Williams 
felt constrained by the earlier authorities which have dealt 
with this issue to find that section 3(3)(b )(ii) had no 
application. In the absence of such a supposed 
preponderance of authority it is clear that the Master would 
have found that section 3(3)(b )(ii) applied, even though the 
Duncans had been "in default" under the agreement for over 
a year, and, during that period had never received adequate 
disclosure in terms of the Act. 
In these circumstances it is necessary to consider the 
essential elements of the earlier decisions relied upon by 
Master Williams in order to determine whether, in truth, they 
ineluctably lead to the conclusions which Master Williams so 
reluctantly adopted. 
The earliest case to deal with section 3(3)(b )(ii) is Wrightson 
NMA Limited v Mead.38 In that case the defendants , Mr and 
Mrs Mead, were farmers who had recently purcha ed a farm 
and who sought to purchase a herd of cows through the 
plaintiff (Wrightsons). In due course a suitable herd was 
located and the Meads agreed to buy it. They signed a sale 
note which required them to make payment of the balance of 
the purchase price within 14 days. The Meads were unable 
to find the required amount on the due date and advised 
Wrightsons of this. Wrightsons advised that payment of 
interest would be required in addition to the balance of the 
38 (1984) 1 NZBLC 102, 093 
39 
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purcha e price. The i ue in thi ea e wa whether 
Wright on were entitled to payment of intere t. 
The Mead submitted that they were not liable for payment 
of intere t a either a revolving credit contract or a controlled 
credit contract exi ted within the meaning of the Credit 
Contract Act and that Wright on had failed to comply with 
the provi ion of that Act. 
Wrightson argued, inter alia, that the exception contained in 
section 3(3)(b)(ii) applied. 
After finding that there was a controlled credit contract and 
that, in the absence of any exception, proper di clo ure 
should have been made, his Honour con idered39 the 
applicability of section 3(3)(b)(ii): 
The second submission related to the situation which aro e 
on 16 June 1982. The defendant aid in evidence that 
because of the deferment in the dairy company payment , he 
knew he would not be in a po ition to pay for the tock on 16 
June and he accordingly went to ee a Mr Peter Lewi of the 
plaintiff company on that date. The defendant said that Mr 
Lewis informed him that the plaintiff company would make 
its payout some time before October. The defendant say 
that the interest rate was not discussed. but that Mr Lewi 
informed him that the plaintiff company would just charge 
the ordinary interest rate [as against the higher penalty rate] 
through until payment was made. Mr Lewi was not called 
and effectively the evidence of the defendant is the only 
material before me relating to this transaction. The 
defendant says that the arrangement was a controlled credit 
contract within the meaning of s.15 of the Credit Contracts 
Act. There is no doubt that the arrangement came within the 
definition of "credit contract" and since the plaintiff is a 
financier, I think the arrangement was a controlled credit 
Supra n.38 at 102, 097 
40 
41 
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contract for the purposes of s.15 of the Credit Contracts Act 
1981 unless it came within one of the exceptions. 
And further: 40 
That provision [i.e. section 3(3)(b)(ii)] is, in my view, 
designed to cover figures included in contracts as 
liquidated damages. I do not consider that it covers 
this case, for if it did there would be a loophole in the 
Act so wide that its provisions could be avoided by a 
simple conveyancing device. In this case, what the 
parties talked about was interest on an amount loaned, 
which is precisely what the Act is designed to cover. 
....... .in my view a precise and definite agreement was 
entered into when the defendants' shortfall was known 
at the time of settlement. 
The next case which dealt with the issue is Patrikios 
Holdings Limited v United Fisheries Limited.41 
Patrikios was a fish retailer. It bought fish from United, a 
fish wholesaler, by auction and otherwise. Patrikios also 
sold fish, and, in so doing, extended credit to certain of its 
customers. 
There was no written contract between the parties as to terms 
of trade. Sales to Patrikios by auction were made on the 
basis of payment in full within seven days. United required 
payment of other purchases by Patrikios to be made within 
seven days of date of statement, although a considerable sum 
was invariably owed by Patrikios for outstanding purchases. 
The parties operated a current account. Patrikios owed 
United moneys, about two-thirds of which wa more than 
three months overdue. Any payments made from time to 
Supra n.38 at 102, 097 
(1986) 1NZBLC 102,423 
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time were applied in reduction of the current account. 
Patrikios made no directions to United a to appropriation of 
the fund paid. Concerned for its liquidity, United wrote to 
Patrikios ("the credit letter") requiring Patrikios to adhere to 
weekly payment terms for all future purchases. The credit 
letter also stated a charge would be added to weekly account 
on any overdue balance ("the interest"). 
Patrikios received the credit letter and continued to trade with 
United. From then on, United sent weekly statements to 
Patrikios showing purchases made, the interest calculation, 
and any credits for payments received. 
The parties continued to trade until 1 June 1984. Patrikios 
then paid a large part of its current account, and directed that 
this payment should be credited to purchase and not intere t. 
It did not consider itself to owe any more to United. United 
prepared to wind up Patrikios to recover its debt. Patrikio 
responded by obtaining an injunction restraining the winding 
up, and making application to reopen the contract made 
between the parties. 
By a counterclaim, United sought the balance of it current 
account, together with interest at the rate stipulated in the 
credit letter. 
It was common ground between the parties that United was a 
financier under s.2(1) of the Credit Contract Act 1981 and it 
had not made disclosure of the terms of the contract as 
required by the Act. 
Holland J held, inter alia, that: 
1. Patrikios had made purchases after receipt of the 
credit letter, and without settling it account within the 
seven-day period stipulated. It had therefore accepted 
the terms of the credit letter and these became part of 
42 
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the contract between the parties. United was entitled 
to charge interest on the overdue accounts. 
2. The transaction between the parties was a credit 
contract within terms of s.3(1)(d) of the Credit 
Contracts Act. United had an implied right to give 
reasonable notice to Patrikios calling up the current 
balance and interest, but this did not bring the 
transaction within s.3(l)(i) of the Act and prevent it 
from being a credit contract. 
3. Each purchase by Patrikios following its receipt of the 
credit letter was a credit contract, because of the 
express or implied promise to pay interest on all such 
purchases not settled within the seven-day period. 
4 The election by Patrikios to pay interest rather than 
cash did not constitute a default under s.3(3)(b)(ii) of 
the Credit Contracts Act. 
Section 3(3)(b )(ii) was directed at a contractual provision for 
damages by way of penalty for default, rather than a 
provision giving a purchaser an option of paying cash or 
paying interest on an overdue balance. 
His Honour stated:42 
I am satisfied that each time the plaintiff purchased 
fish from the defendant following the letter of 12 
March 1980 it entered into a credit contract by virtue 
of the express or implied promise of the plaintiff to 
pay interest at 0.4% per week in respect of all 
purchases not settled within seven days of auction or 
statement. Section 3(3)(b) provides a number of 
amounts that are not to be included as part of the sum 
or sums of money promised to be paid in the future 
referred to in s.3(l)(d). Subparagraph (ii) of that 
Supra n.41 at 102, 429 
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subsection is "any reasonable amount payable as a 
result of default under the contract by the promisor". I 
do not regard the agreement to pay interest in the 
circumstances of this case as being an amount payable 
as a result of default within the meaning of the 
subparagraph. It was contemplated by the parties that 
interest would be payable after seven days. and I do 
not regard the acceptance by the plantiff of the 
liability to pay interest rather than pay cash as being a 
"default". Like Gallen J in Wrightson NMA Ltd v 
Mead & Anor (1984) 1 NZBLC 102, 093, I regard the 
statutory provision as being designed to cover a 
provision in a contract for damages by way of penalty 
for default rather than as here a provision giving a 
purchaser an option of payment cash or paying 
interest on the balance overdue. (Emphasis added) 
The final significant case requiring analysis is McHaffie v 
Pyne Gould Guiness Limited.43 The facts of this case are 
that McHaffie (a farmer) purchased stock at an auction from 
Pyne Gould Guiness Ltd (the auctioneer). He took delivery 
of the stock but did not pay for it until almost two years later. 
The auction had been conducted in accordance with the 
normal practice in the area. The conditions for the sale at the 
auction had been displayed in front of the auctioneer's box. 
Attention was drawn to clause 12 of these conditions by the 
auctioneer's invoice and subsequent monthly statements. It 
stated in clear print that payment should be paid within 14 
days from date of purchase, otherwise interest would be 
charged. At no stage was there any protest or query from 
McHaffie. Judgment was entered in the District Court for 
the auctioneer. The District Court ruled that interest was 
payable at a rate that had been shown in court to be the 
normal rate being charged and paid for unpaid amount on 
stock purchases by farmers. The farmer appealed the 
decision on the grounds that the tran action was a controlled 
credit contract under which disclosure was required. 
43 (1990) 3 NZBLC 101,847 
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Counsel for the auctioneer submitted that a charge of interest 
was customary according to the particular business involving 
the parties to this action, and at no stage was there any 
agreement between the farmer and the auctioneer by which 
the auctioneer was to loan moneys to the farmer or to extend 
credit in any way. 
Williamson J held that the right to charge interest flowed 
clearly from the conditions of sale displayed prominently at 
the auction, and that the argument between the parties on 
whether the transaction was a controlled credit contract, 
which required disclosure, centred around the provisions of 
s.3(3)(b)(ii) of the Act. 
In deciding whether the transaction was "in substance or 
effect a credit contract" [by virtue of section 3( 4)] the 
definition of a credit contract in s.3(1) must be considered. 
When the totality of the evidence concerning the position 
between the farmer and the auctioneer was looked at, only 
s.3(1)(a) and (d) might have been applicable. The first 
required proof of an agreement by the auctioneer to lend 
while the second required proof that the farmer had promised 
to pay in the future. In this case there were no further 
discussions between the parties relating to interest, and 
therefore an absence of the required agreement or promise. 
The provisions of s.3(3)(b)(ii) therefore were not applicable 
as there was no credit contract within the meaning of the Act 
in this particular case. 
Williamson J stated:44 
Another case referred to by Counsel wa Wrightson 
NMA Ltd v Mead (1984) 1 NZBLC 102,093, Gallen 
J. This case also concerned the sale of stock, namely 
a herd of sharemilking farm. There was no 
arrangement that the plantiff stock company would 
Supra n.43 at 101, 850 
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provide the finance. Later, after the purchase of the 
stock had been completed, and when the purchasers 
had not received the amount of money which they 
anticipated from another source, other arrangements 
were made between the stock company and the 
purchasers as a result of which credit was extended. 
Mr Justice Gallen was careful to point out in his 
judgment at p 102, 096 that: 
"A credit contract is defined in s.3 of the Act. 
The section is detailed and comprehensive, but 
every arrangement which comes within the 
definitions contained within it is one which 
depends upon agreement." 
In that case there had been discussions concerning 
extension of credit to the Meads. Mr Justice Gallen 
concluded that there was such an agreement and that it 
did come within the definition of a credit contract. He 
further held that the provision of s.3(3)(b)(ii) was not 
applicable .... 
The difference between the Wrightson NMA Ltd v 
Mead case and the present case is that in this case 
there were no further discussions between the parties 
relating to interest. 
With respect, it is submitted that His Honour was a little too 
slow to infer the necessary agreement, or exchange of 
promises, which would have converted the transactions into a 
credit contract, possibly with the assistance of section 3( 4 ). 
This is particularly the case given the reasoning of Holland J 
in Patrikios whereby His Honour was prepared to infer the 
necessary agreement from a continued course of dealings, 
whereby regular and monthly notice that interest was 
running on the debt were received by Patrikios from United. 
It is submitted that the fact of a continued course of dealing 
in Patrikios, in contra t to the once-only purchase in 
45 
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McHaffie, is not a factor which can be relied upon to 
distinguish the Patrikios reasoning on the McHaffie facts, 
because in Patrikios it will be recalled that it was held that 
each separate purchase by Patrikios from United following 
its receipt of the credit letter was a separate credit contract. 
In this regard, His Honour noted45 the arguments of counsel: 
For the Respondent it was argued that the evidence of 
the sale of the stock to the Appellant did not involve 
any arrangement to extend credit. It was submitted 
that at no stage had there been any agreement between 
the Appellant and the Respondent by which the 
Respondent was to loan moneys to the Appellant or to 
extend credit in any way. In contrast it was argued the 
Appellant had effectively helped himself to credit by 
failure to pay for the stock within the 14 days given 
for payment. 
His Honour found46 that there was an absence of the 
necessary meeting of minds, despite having found 
specifically that there was a right to charge interest in certain 
defined circumstances: 
The basis of Counsel's submission that there were two 
distinct transactions are the terms of the conditions for 
sale which require payment by cash but which allow 
the auctioneer to deliver the stock to the purchaser 
without payment in full and to debit the purchaser's 
account either with the auctioneer or with the 
purchaser's own stock and station agent. Clause 12, 
which appears to provide for the payment of interest 
by the purchaser, is, according to Counsel, restricted 
to the situation in which the purchaser is unable to 
finance the purchase through the Respondent or 
elsewhere. Remedies given to the auctioneer under 
Supra n.43 at 101 , 849 
Supra n.43 at 101,848 
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this clause, it was submitted, are limited to the 
situation where the auctioneer was acting as the 
vendor's agent and not as principal. 
After re-reading the relevant clauses and considering 
the submissions of both Counsel, I am of the view that 
there was only one transaction. The Appellant 
purchased stock from the Respondent as agent of the 
vendor. It was a term of this sale that the auctioneer 
as the vendor's agent would be entitled to recover not 
only the full amount of the unpaid purchase money 
but also interest calculated from the dale of sale. The 
rate of such interest was to be that charged by the 
auctioneer on overdue accounts. In this case there is 
no evidence of any separate transaction between the 
Appellant and Respondent. The right to charge 
interest flows clearly from the express terms of the 
conditions of sale. 
With respect, it is difficult following His Honour's reasoning 
in this regard. If there was a sufficient meeting of minds, as 
His Honour had found, then surely there must also have been 
a sufficient exchange of promi es to bring the transaction 
within, at least, section 3(1)(d), whereby the farmer can 
reasonably be interpreted to have agreed to pay a sum or 
sums in the future exceeding, in aggregate the cash price of 
the property sold to him, even if that promise was based on a 
contingency, ie. that payment in full would not be made on 
the due date. 
It is submitted that ince the stock was purchased on 
customary terms prominently displayed at the auction, His 
Honour should have found that the exception contained in 
section 3(3)(b)(ii) did not apply, and then proceeded to 
consider the appropriate end result by applying section 32. 
This i particularly the case since the farmer made the 
purchase in early May 1985 and only managed a (part) 
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payment of $15,000 of the cash price of $15,101.75 in late 
April 1987. So, the charging of interest continued for some 
23 months before any payment was made. Because of the 
lack of any required disclo ure under the Act the farmer wa , 
it is submitted, deprived of the ability to go "credit-shopping" 
to try to refinance the debt at more favourable rate to 
himself, regardless of whether, in fact, a more favourable 
deal was available. 
Conclusions 
1. For the reasons given above, the reasoning in 
Williams and Kettle Ltd v Duncan, Wrightson NMA 
Ltd v Mead and Patrikios Holdings Ltd v United 
Fisheries Ltd is to be preferred to the reasoning of 
Williamson, Jin McHaffie v Pyne Gould Guiness. 
This statement should be qualified by the fact that, in 
Williams and Kettle, Master Williams felt him elf 
compelled to decide in accordance with the 
preponderance of earlier authority on the issue, given 
the closeness of the fact situations in those early 
authorities to the factual situation which he was 
dealing with. One gets the clear impression that if a 
future set of facts presented itself which were more 
easily distinguishable from the fact situations in the 
earlier cases to which Master Williams referred, that 
the Master would have no hesitation in so 
distinguishing that line of authority and finding that 
the exception contained in section 3(3)(b)(ii) applied. 
2. With the exception of Williamson J in McHaffie, it is 
discernible from the judgments that a factor 
influencing the deci ions of their Honours was the fact 
that the Credit Contracts Act was intended to be 
extremely broadly based, to cover the full gamut of 
credit transactions, properly so described. Their 
Honours appeared reluctant to create what they may 
have seen as a trojan horse into the heart of the 
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philosophy behind the Act. In this regard the 
comments of Master Williams in Williams and 
Kettle47 are particularly in point. It is submitted that 
in seeking to limit the applicability of the section 
3(3 )(b )(ii) exception to cases in which the provision in 
the contract is for liquidated damages by way of 
penalty for default, rather than to cases where the 
provision is really an option for the purchaser to pay 
cash or to pay interest on any balance overdue, the 
correct approach to the scope of the exception has 
been taken. 
3. Perhaps the most startling factor of the above cases, is 
the considerable length of time that the debtors had 
been owing the sale price plus intere t charges under 
the original contract, e.g. in McHaffie, there was a 
period of 2 years until the cash price payment was 
made by the debtor. It is submitted that it is repellent 
to common sense to continue to characterise a default 
which continues for this length of time, as continuing 
to fall within the exception created by section 
3(3)(b)(ii). Surely, at some point in time an amount 
which may originally have been intended to be a spur 
to a purchaser to settle a cash transaction promptly, 
must metamorphose into an extended credit 
arrangement. Of course, a reasonable delimitation of 
this time threshold will necessarily vary from case to 
case. However, it is suggested that a "cut off point" 
be drawn at 2 months. 
In selecting a period of 2 months, consistency is 
achieved with the exclusion from the meaning of 
credit contract contained in section 3( 1 )(i) which 
provides that: 
Supra n.34 at 102,414 
A contract for the sale of property, or the 
provision of services, to a person if the total 
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amount payable under the contract by the 
person ( other than any amount payable solely 
as a result of a default in payment by him) is 
the agreed price of the property or services and 
is to be paid within 2 months from the date the 
contract is made. (Emphasis added) 
4. Given that a major policy imperative of the Act is that 
credit transactions should be uniformly disclosed to 
facilitate credit shopping, then it is submitted that 
section 3(3)(b )(ii) should be amended by the addition 
of the words "provided that payment of any such 
amount does not continue beyond 2 months from the 
date that the contract is made". As stated above, it is 
submitted that this would provide a common-sense 
and reasonable (though, necessarily, arbitrary) 
additional limitation on the exception contained in 
section 3(3)(b )(ii) and would also bring this provision 
into line with section 3(1)(i), if the consequential 
amendments to that section recommended below are 
also adopted. 
5. It must be noted that the exclusion contained in 
section 3(l)(i) is premised on a stipulation in the 
contract or transaction to the effect that the total 
amount payable under the contract is to be paid within 
2 months from the date of the contract. In situations 
where there is no such stipulation contained in the 
contract, or which can not be implied, then the 
exception from the definition of "credit contract" doe 
not apply. It is submitted that if the amendment to 
section 3(3)(b )(ii) recommended above is adopted, 
then section 3(1)(i) should also be consequentially 
amended by adding to the words in brackets in section 
3(1)(i) as follows: 
( other than any amount payable solely as a 
result of a default in payment by him and 
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provided that payment of any such amount 
does not continue beyond 2 months from the 
date the contract is made). 
6. Even though this issue has not been discussed above, 
for completeness it is submitted that the reference to 
"any reasonable amount" is inappropriate in section 
3(3)(b )(ii). Its use is clearly intended to guide the 
courts towards making the distinction between a 
penalty provision and an amount of liquidated 
damages which is a genuine pre-estimate of loss 
arising from a default. If the payment is "reasonable" 
then, prima facie, it is not a penalty, and is therefore 
enforceable When looking at subparagraphs 3(3)(b)(i) 
- (v) one can see quite a clear rationale for inserting 
the word "reasonable" in all of those subparagraphs 
except, it is submitted, subparagraph 3. 
The rationale in relation to the other subparagraphs is 
that as long as these amounts are reasonable, then a 
court can more easily draw the conclusion that such 
amounts provide extra value, whether in relation to a 
cash sale or a credit transaction, and so could not 
sensibly be classified as forming part of the total cost 
of credit. 
In relation to section 3(3)(b)(ii) however, it is 
submitted that the attempt by the use of the word 
"reasonable" to draw the distinction between penalties 
and liquidated damages referred to above is strictly 
irrelevant to achieve the desired purpose of the 
subparagraph. 
The issue of whether a payment is correctly 
identifiable as a penalty or as liquidated damages is a 
completely separate issue from whether the amount is 
payable as a result of default. It is ubmitted that it is 
only this latter issue which is relevant for the purposes 
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of the Credit Contracts Act. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that the word "reasonable" should also be 
deleted from the subparagraph. 
Recommendations 
1. Following from the above conclusions, it is 
recommended that section 3(3)(b)(ii) be amended to 
read: 
Any amount payable as a result of a default 
under the contract by the promisor provided 
that payment of any such amount does not 
continue beyond 2 months from the date the 
contract is made. 
2. It is recommended that section 3(1)(i) be 
consequentially amended as follows: 
5. EPILOGUE 
(i) A contract for the sale of property, or 
the provision of services, to a person if 
the total amount payable under the 
contract by the person ( other than any 
amount payable solely as a result of a 
default in payment by him provided that 
payment of any such amount does not 
continue beyond 2 months from the date 
the contract is made) ... 
This paper has considered in depth 3 problem areas which the writer 
has identified in the course of his professional practice. There are, 
of course, quite a number of other problem areas which space has 
precluded from being given treatment in this paper. 
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Other outstanding legal problem issues which the writer has 
identified include the applicability of the Credit Contracts Act to 
simple lease transactions, the treatment of leases under the Hire 
Purchase Act 1971 for disclosure purposes (particularly in relation 
to disclosed residual values under leases) and the inter-relationship 
of the Credit Contracts Act, the Hire Purchase Act and the Door to 
Door Sales Act 1967. Each of these three statutes has its own 
particular disclosure regime. Section 52A of the Hire Purchase Act 
provides that the provisions of the Credit Contracts Act that apply to 
hire purchase agreements ( deferred payment dispositions of 
property) shall apply in addition to the provisions of the Hire 
Purchase Act, and neither Act shall limit the provisions of the other. 
Though this provision is deceptively simple, there is a myriad of 
problems which relate to exactly what has to be disclosed under the 
Hire Purchase Act to also comply with the disclosure requirements 
of the Credit Contracts Act. The disclosure requirements of the 
Credit Contracts Act are super-added on to the disclosure regime 
established under the Hire Purchase Act, but because of the 
structure of the Hire Purchase Act, and the rather complex 
definition of "total cost of credit" contained in the Credit Contracts 
Act, numerous extremely nasty problems arise in practice. 
At the end of the day, while people theoretically must somehow do 
their best to comply with the disclosure regimes imposed by both 
Acts, there is a clear and urgent necessity to further co-ordinate the 
Acts so that there is a uniform disclosure regime established which 
applies to transactions under both Acts. 
Also, hire purchase transactions in the context of door to door sales 
provide problems in relation to disclosure. The Door to Door Sales 
Act again has its own separate disclosure regime and issues arise 
about the necessity for disclosure of hire purchase transactions in 
the door to door sales context also complying with the full 
disclosure requirements of both the Credit Contracts Act and Hire 
Purchase Act. One could certainly be forgiven for describing this 
duplication and confusing overlap as legislative overkill. 
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There is also the problem of the correct disclosure treatment of pre-
payments under the Credit Contracts Act in relation to hire purchase 
transactions. For example, if there is a disclosure error under the 
Credit Contracts Act then the cooling off period provided by section 
22 of the Credit Contracts Act will not start until correct disclosure 
has been made. Under the Hire Purchase Act there is a separate 
disclosure regime, and once again the two regimes do not sit 
comfortably together. Also, in relation to modification disclosure of 
a credit contract, separate modification disclosure regimes are 
provided by the Credit Contracts Act and section 10 of the Hire 
Purchase Act. These regimes are inconsistent with each other in 
certain respects. 
Another area of considerable uncertainty is the correct method of 
stating the finance rate in open-ended situations where the amount 
of credit and/or the total cost of credit is not known at the start of 
the contract, e.g. revolving credit facilities, floating interest rate 
loans, multi-currency facilities where future NZ dollar liabilities 
will be determined by the then prevailing NZ dollar cross-rate with 
the foreign currency being borrowed, and also progressive draw-
down facilities, where the draw-down dates are at the (limited) 
discretion of the borrower (sections 6 and 5(2)(a)-(d). 
There are also quite a few policy issues which would require 
discussion in any comprehensive review of the Act. The most 
important of these is the wide ambit of the Act and the mechanism 
used to distinguish "consumer" from "business transactions". 
The Credit Contracts Act 1981 is unique throughout the world in 
applying to both consumer and business transactions. It can be 
persuasively argued that the exclusions relating to controlled credit 
contracts which are found in section 15 of the Act are inappropriate. 
In particular the $250,000 transaction threshold contained in section 
15(l)(f) is generally regarded by the business community as being 
far too high. Over the years an informal consensus appears to have 
developed that a figure in the region of $50,000 would be an 
appropriate cut-off point above which disclosure, at least, would not 
have to be made. It is, of course, arguable that whether or not the 
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disclosure regime applies to controlled credit contracts whether the 
power to re-open oppressive credit contracts should also be so 
limited. Again, it is suggested that in relation to transactions 
involving more than $50,000 strong arguments could be put forward 
for suggesting that the re-opening provisions of the Act were 
inapplicable. The only caveat that the writer would make in this 
regard is that an exception would have to be made, at least, for 
major and essential consumer transactions, e.g. the purchase of a 
residential property. Again, there are some complex legal and 
philosophical questions which arise in the context of this debate. 
Another policy issue relates to the validity of the credit shopping 
rationale, which has been discussed above in Section 2. It will be 
recalled that in that section the writer submitted that as it appears 
that very little credit shopping probably occurs in the vast majority 
of transactions, there can be strong arguments made, at least, for the 
repeal of the provisions relating to the 3 day cooling off period 
(section 22). 
There are numerous other policy issues that could be addressed, 
such as the necessity to retain the disclosure regime in its current 
detailed form, through to the desirability of repealing the Act 
completely, given that in the 12 years since the Act was passed 
there has been a revolution in the New Zealand market place such 
that many categories of consumers of credit products would use the 
quality of extent of disclosure as a differentiator when deciding 
which credit provider to patronise. This would, of course, be to 
largely ignore the credit "underclass" whom the Act was also 
intended to protect. 
Another approach to the continued necessity for all or part of the 
Act would be to argue that if unfair contracts legislation of general 
application is introduced, that this should be able to sub ume and 
replace at least the Part 1 re-opening provisions and, together with 
the Fair Trading Act 1986, possibly also the disclosure regime in 
Part 2. 
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As can be seen, the policy issues that could be debated in relation to 
the Act are myriad and varied and the various answers given to the 
issues raised will perhaps depend more on the protagonists' 
philosophical leanings rather than on any nice points of law. 
6. 
7 
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